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In Connecticut a condition annexed to a sale of goods that the title shall not
pass to the vendee until payment of the price, is valid as against the vendee's
creditors.
Nor is such condition necessarily rendered invalid as to creditors by the fact that
the property is of such a nature that it will be consumed in the use, and that the
vendee is authorized to dispose of it before payment of the price.
In such case, if the vendee is authorized to dispose of the property as his own,
the condition for the retention of title by the vendor will be void, but if the vendee
is simply authorized to transfer the title of the vendor the condition will be good.
Where the condition for the retention of title by the vendor is express and positive, the court will construe an authority given to the vendee to dispose of the
property as simply an authority to transfer the vendor's title.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Hartford county. Case stated
setting forth the following fihcts:
On June 15th 1880, at New Britain, plaintiffs made to one
McAvoy a conditional sale of two and a half barrels of liquors,
and on July 9th 1880, a conditional sale of one barrel of liquor.
All of said merchandise was immediately placed in McAvoy's
possession.
It was an express condition of both said sales that the title to
said merchandise should not vest in the said vendee until the
merchandise was fully paid for, and until such payments were
made the title to said merchandise was to be and remain in said
vendors.
On October 9th 1880, said merchandise was attached as the
property of McAvoy in a suit brought against him by defendants.
At the time of the attachment the two and a half barrels of
liquor sold June 15th remained intact. The one barrel sold July
9th had been opened a few days before and a small quantity of
liquor drawn therefrom and sold. It was the intention of McAvoy
to have paid for all said merchandise on the day after said attachment was made, when the agent of plaintiffs was expected to be in
New Britain.
Said McAvoy is a retailer of liquors, and it was supposed by
the parties that said merchandise would be used in his business,
-and in case any of said merchandise should have been sold and
consumed before the conditions of sale were complied with, the
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vendors could only enforce their condition against such portion
thereof as might remain unsold.
No payments had been made upon the merchandise at the time
of the attachment. Plaintiffs made a demand on the officer serving the attachment to return the goods, and also requested defendants to pay the amounts unpaid thereon, but both of these requests
were refused.
If the condition attached to the sales of said merchandise was
valid and operative in law, judgment to be rendered for the return
of said merchandise, otherwise for the defendants.
The court below entered judgment for defendants, whereupon
plaintiffs took this writ of error.
Mitchell

Hunge~ford, for plaintiffs.

John JlMalsh, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Loois, J.-There is much contrariety of reasoning and
decision relative to the validity of what are called conditional
sales in different states, and often to some extent in the same state.
The courts of Pennsylvania have most firmly established the
rule that a sale and delivery of personal property, with an agreement that the ownership shall remain in the vendor until the
purchase-money is paid, is fraudulent and void as to creditors of
the vendee and innocent purchasers; but they are obliged to
except cases of bailnient where no present contract of sale is
regarded as made, and they have often found difficulty in distinguishing between cases that lie near the border line separating
sales from bailments, where there is a condition upon which the
bailee may become the owner. See Statfield v. Huntsman,
10 W. N. 0. 216; Brunswick v. Hoover, Id. 219, and cases
there cited.
The courts of New York seem to concur with those of Pennsylvania in holding conditional sales void as to purchasers: Steelyards v. Singer, 2 Hilton 96; Smith v. Iynes, 1 Seld. 41 ;
Hfaggerty v. Palmer, 6 Johns. Ch. 437 ; but differ by giving effect
to them against levies made by creditors and assignments in trust,
or as security for the payment of antecedent debts : Haggerty v.
Palmer, and Smith v. L,ynes, supra; Keeler v. Field, 1 Paige
312; Herring .v. Hoppoek, 15 N. Y. 409; Beaver v. Lane, Cr
Duer 232; Wait v. Green, 35 Barb. 585. But where the agree-
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ment confers on the conditional vendee the right to sell, or a right
inconsistent with continued ownership of the original vendor, the
courts of New York pronounce the transaction fraudulent as
against both creditors and purchasers: Ludden, v. .Hazen, 31
Barb. 650; Bonesteel v. -Flack,41 Id. 485; Powell v. Preston,
1 Hun 513. In Maine, Vermont and Massachusetts the condition that the right of property shall remain in the vendor until
payment, is held good not only as between the original parties, but
also against purchasers from the vendee, and creditors of the
latter, even when possession goes with the sale, and there is
nothing to indicate that it was not absolute.
In all the cases of this class that have hitherto been considered
by this court, the court has uniformly and consistently applied the
principle embodied in the ancient maxim "that when a man hath
a thing he may condition with it as he will :" 1 Shep. Touch.,
p. 118.
In the leading case of -orbes v. Al]_arsh, 15 Conn. 384, WIILLIAMS, 0. J., in delivering the opinion, cited several cases decided
by the courts of Massachusetts, and added: "It is claimed, however, that these and many other cases of a similar character, are
peculiar to that state. The court think otherwise, and that they
are based upon the principle of the common law, which construes
contracts according to the intention of the parties, and allows men
to contract according to their own pleasure, unless contrary to 'the
policy of the law or certain technical rules. The owner may dispose of his property to whomsoever he pleases at any time and in
any manner: 2 Black. Cora. 447. When he relies upon his
remedy, it is but. just that he should be left to it according to his
agreement; but, on the contrary, there is no reason why a man
should be forced to trust where he never meant it: I OLT, 0. J.,

in Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Salk. 171. For the agreement of the minds
of the parties is the only thing the law respects in contracts:
Plowd. 0. 140." * * * "The rule of law making the property
of one man liable for the debts of others in whose hands it is
found, is applicable particularly to that property which was once
owned by the possessor, and is by him sold or mortgaged to
another, and then suffered to remain in his possession. In such
cases possession is evidence of fraud, because there is not given to
the world the usual evidence of a change of title. The vendor,
or mortgagor, is therefore presumed to remain owner of the pro-
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perty as theretofore. It is otherwise in cases like that before us.
The vendee comes into possession of property which was known to
belong to another man. Whether, therefore, the vendee had borrowed it or hired it or purchased it, becomes a matter of inquiry,
and ought to be ascertained by him who proposes to trust his property upon the faith of this appearance; for the law offers its protecting shield to those who attempt to protect themselves. Accordingly we find that all these cases of conditional sales made bona
fide have been held good as against attaching creditors as well
as against the parties." This case and its doctrine have been
re-affirmed in Cragin v. Coe, 29 Conn. 51; Hart Y. Garpenter, 24
Id. 427; Tomlinson v. Roberts, 25 Id. 477 iluphes v. Kelly,
40 Id. 148, and Brown v. Fitch, 43 Id. 512.
But it must be observed that these cases, while firmly sustaining the condition and protecting the title of the original vendor
against all other parties, do not directly involve the precise question now presented. Those cases are all distinguishable from this
in two particulars--the property was of a nature not nec.ssarily
to be consumed in the use; and there was no sort of concession
on the part of the original vendor that the conditional vendee
might dispose of the property without first paying the price agreed
upon. Both these elements, to some extent at least, exist in the
present case, and occasion hesitation on the part of the court as
to the validity of the condition as against the creditors of McAvoy.
The finding bearing upon the question is as follows: "It was
an express condition of both sales that the title to said merchandise should not vest in the said vendee until the merchandise was
fully paid for; and, until such payments were made, the title to said
merchandise was to be and remain in said vendors." * * * " Said
McAvoy is a retailer of liquors; and it was supposed by the parties that said merchandise zould be used in his business; and, in
case any of said merchandise should have been sold and consumed
before the conditions of sale were complied with, the vendors could
only enforce their condition against such portion thereof as might
remain unsold."
Under such an agreement, after the -property has been attached
by creditors, will the law consider it as belonging to the plaintiff
or to his conditional vendee, McAvoy?
If we invoke the aid of the courts of other states to give an
answer to this question we find decisions of the highest courts
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of Maine, Vermont and Massachusetts protecting the title of the
original vendor under agreements substantially the same as the
one we are considering.
In Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71 Me. 222, goods were bought by a
retail trader upon condition that the property should not vest in
him until they were fully paid for, but with an understanding
between the parties that they were to go into the store of the
conditional purchaser and be sold by him in the regular course
of trade; and it was held that they did not pass to the assignee,
in insolvency of the latter, for the benefit of his creditors, although
the original vendor would have been estopped to deny the title
of those who might purchase portions of them of the retailer in
the regular course of his business; and it was distinctly held that
it was not essential to the existence and validity of such a condition that the conditional vendor should have no right to sell to
others. BARROWS, J., in giving the opinion, said: "We see no
legal objection to a wholesale dealer making a conditional sale to
a retailer with the understanding that he may dispose of the
goods as they may be called for at retail, but that, as between
themselves, the property shall not pass until the goods are paid
for; and, in such case, while the purchaser at retail would get a
title which the original vendor could not impeach because of his
agreement with the retailer, it would be the title of the original
vendor, and not that of the retailer, who has none, and can convey none, except in the manner which his arrangement with the
vendor permits."
In Armington v. HYouston, 38 Vt. 448, the plaintiff sold one
Thompson provisions on a condition made in good faith that they
were to remain the property of the plaintiff until paid for, but
with the understanding that Thompson might consume them in
his family. The defendant, a constable, attached the provisions
in behalf of a creditor of Thompson. Held, that the condition
was valid, and the title to the goods remained in the plaintiff
until they were paid for or consumed. KELLOGG, J., in delivering the opinion of the court said: "It was the unquestionable
right of the plaintiff to sell this property to Thompson upon the
condition that, until payment of the price, the property should
remain the plaintiff's. The retention of the title to the property
is not a fraud upon any person, and such a contract is one which
every person has a right to make. In a conditional sale, the
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possession of the property is ordinarily transferred to the vendee,
and very frequently with expectation of both of the parties to the
sale that the property will be used by the vendee; but, in such
cases, the vendee is, until the performance of the condition, only
a bailee of the property for t specific purpose, and he acquires no
property in the goods from the possession merely. This right
rests upon the agreement of the parties, and their intention in
making the contract of sale is to be carried -into effect, if the
transaction was entered into in good faith, unless the contract is
one which contravenes some established rule of law."
Of the Massachusetts cases, the one most in point is Burbank
v. Crooker d- another, 7 Gray 158, where there was a sale and
delivery of a stock of goods to a shopkeeper to be put into his
shop for sale, but upon condition that the title should not vest in
him until payment of the price, and it was held that the title did
not pass, and the condition was operative as against even a purchaser from him of the whole stock of goods; although it was also
held that had a sale been made of individual articles in the
ordinary course of business in a country store, the plaintiff might
have been estopped to assert any right adverse to such purchaser,
having placed them in the hands of such dealer with the understanding that they were to be thus used.
The New York cases already referred to render it probable that
the courts of that state would declare such a condition inoperative,
,although there is a distinction of some significance between the
case of Ludden v. Hazen, supra, on which the defendant relies,
and the case at bar, in this-that in the former, the vendee, to use
the language of the court, was to "run his unlicensed grocery
upon borrowed whiskey," all of which, by the terms'of the agreement. was to be paid for only when sold, showing that a sale by
,the grocery man was the most prominent.part of the contract. In
,so flagrant, a case, it might well be held that the condition was
'colorable, fraudulent and void. We concede, however, that the
.reasoning contained in the opinion renders it probable that the
contract we are considering would in that state be declared void
.against purchasers and creditors.
The finding in the case now under consideration leaves it a little
.in doubt how far the parties contemplated any use of the liquors
in M'cAvoy's business until paid for by him, and it appears that,
,although the latter had had possession for several months, yet all
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the packages remained intact except one, which was opened, and
a small quantity drawn therefrom a day or two before the attachment, and on the day aftei the attachment fuil payment was
intended to-be made to the agent, who was then expected in New
Britain.
But conceding that the parties actually contemplated that there
might be some sales made before actual payment of the price, yet
the terms of the agreement, coupled with the conduct of the conditional vendee in pursuance of it, evince the perfect good faith
and bona fide character of the transaction, so that it cannot be
pronounced void on account of any wrong intent of the parties.
If, therefore, the condition is to be held inoperative at all, the law
must so declare it upon grounds of public policy, because it was
calculated to give the one clothed with the possession.a false credit,
or else upon the ground that the plaintiffs, through their contract,
are to be regarded as holding the possessor or conditional vendee
out to the world as absolute owner.
The objection as to giving a false credit has undoubtedly much
force, so that in several states the courts consider it as sufficient,
but it applies with more or less strength, according to the circumstances, to all cases of conditional sales where the vendee is clothed
with fall possession and apparent ownership, but as the court says,
in Forbes v. Iarsh, supra, in this state, ' all these cases of conditional sales made bona fide have been held good against attaching
creditors ;" and in reply to the objection we are considering, it
warns persons against putting faith in appearances, except where
the case comes within the rule of the vendor's retaining possession

after the sale, and persons about to give credit on the faith of such
appearances must make inquiry. In this respect the language of
our courts is similar to that of CAMINIBELL, J., in giving the

opinion in Ketchum 4, Cammings v. Brennan, 53 Miss. 596. "A
buyer must beware of purchasing from one who has not title;
possession is not title."
The other objection, as to holding out the possessor to the world
as absolute owner, is involved partly in the one just considered,
except so far as the contract in question must be construed as contemplating or authorizing a sale by the possessor.
Possession, with the jus disponendi, added, has been regarded
by many courts as a suffi3ient reason for declaring a contract colorable and fraudulent, without regard to the real intent of the
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parties: Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, p. 123, and cases
there referred to.
We concede that there is much force in the reasoning supporting such a rule, but at the same time we must bear in mind the
spirit and drift of our own decisions, as they may have induced
the making of such contracts. While it is true, as already stated,
that no case identical with the present in the particular feature we
are now considering has hitherto been before this court, yet the
qases referred to clearly show that the controlling consideration has
been the bona fide oharacter of the transaction and the honest
meaning and intent of the parties, without applying any technical
rule of public policy, as in the case of a retention of possession by
the vendor after a sale.
The courts of Massachusetts and Connecticut have always been
in harmony on this vexed subject, and the principles hitherto
adopted by us, if they do not logically compel, yet very naturally
lead, to the same result as already reached in that state, where the
title of the original vendor has been protected, notwithstanding
the objection we are considering.
If, however, the contract in question must be construed to
mean that the plaintiff authorized McAvoy to sell the property as
his own, we should be constrained to hold it so absolutely incoisistent with the retention of the title in the plaintiff as to waive
or make void the condition. But in this case the condition that
no title was to pass until payment is so clear, express and positive
in its terms, that we are inclined to give it full effect, and to construe what is afterwards said of the understanding of the parties
relative to a sale, as the court in Rogers' v. Whitelouse, 8upra,
did, that is, the authority is not to sell as his own (having nothing
himself), but simply to transfer the title of the plaintiff in the
manner authorized.
There was error in the judgment complained of, and it is
reversed.
CARPENTER, J., dissented.
It is proposed briefly to consider the

of the greatest importance, not only to

law with regard to transactions on the

buyer and seller or bailor and bailee,

border line between bailmeats and sale;
transactions which are growing daily
more frequent and various. The ques-

but to third persons, second purchasers
and cifditors, whose rights depend so
largely upon those of the original parties.-

tions arising out of them must ever be

The subject has lately been brought
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prominently to the notice of the profession by the two decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, referred
to in the principal ease, viz. : Brunswick
v. Hcrover, 10 Weekly Notes Cases 219,
and Sta~dfeldt v. Huntsman, Id. 216.
The law of the state, upon this point,
where these two cases arise is of early
origin, and maybe said to begin with
the case of 1furyatroyd v. Crauford, 2
Yeates 420; 3 Dall. 491. An action was
brought upon a policy of insurance of the
ship "Mount Vernon."
The fac ts, as
stated in the charge of Judge SuirpzuX,
as reported in Dallas, were as follows:
An Englishman, Duncanson by name,
had come here to settle, and taken the
oath of allegiance to Pennsylvania, but
had not been long enough in the country
to entitle him to naturalization. He applied to Messrs. Willis and Francis to
get him a vessel- with which to trade
with India, private trade with that
country being prohibited in England as
an infringement of the government monopoly. Messrs. Willis and Francis
purchased the " Mount Vernon," and a
bill of sale was made out to them by
plaintiff. It then occurred to Duncanson, that as he had not yet acquired
American citizenship, he was not in a
position to trade as he wished with
safety. Hence, the bill of sale was sent
back, and a new contract entered into
substantially as follows: The plaintiff
should remain the owner of the ship,
and as such retain the register and make
the insurance; she should, however, be
delivered to Duncanson or his agents,
and the plaintiff should empower a passenger on her to assign and transfer the
ship to Duncanson in England, on September Ist, by which time he would be
an American citizen. Purchase-money
to be secured by notes of Willis and
Francis, payable at all events, in instalments. The present insurance was effected by plaintiff as owner of the ship.
In Yeates, Judge SmIPPEN is reported
as saying, " Either a delivery of a
VOL. XXX.-29

chattel contracted for, or payment of the
consideration money will effect a change
of property, where such is the intention
of the parties ; but where the parties do
not contemplate such a change, but
expressly guard against it by contract,
it would seem strange that the property
should pass from the one to the other
contrary to the declared will of both."
The crucial point in the case, however,
was whether or not the arrangement
was an evasion of a certain United
States statute. In Murgatroyd v. Crawford, it was held not to be such an
evasion. But in Afurgatro~yd v. McLure,
4 Dall. 342, Justice CHASE of the
United States Circuit Court arrived at an
opposite conclusion, and in Duncanson v.
McLure, 4 Dall. 308, the judges retracted
their opinion in Hlurgatroydv. Crauford
with regard to the statute ; but they did
not impugn the correctness of their position as to the general law governing such
contracts.
The case of .31artin v. .3fathiot, 14
S. & R. 214, may be considered the
leading case in Pennsylvania on the
subject. It was decided, some thirty
years later than the last-mentioned
case and the conclusion reached was different.
The case was this: Martin
brought trespass against Mathiot, sheriff,
for seizing four wagn horses.
The
defendant justified the seizure under aft.
fa. commanding him to levy a certain
debt upon the property of one Michael.
The question was whether the property
was Martin's or Michael's.
It was
proved that the horses were, and had
been for some time, in the possession of
Michael, who was a wagoner. Before
they came into his possession they were
the property of the plaintiff. The defendant gave evidence that Michael
stood charged on the books of the plaintiff with a debt, amounting to upwards
of $60, and that the plaintiff, apon
being asked whether Michael was the
owner of the horses he was driving,
replied that he vas, provided he should

LEWIS v. MCCABE.
pay that debt. The opin'on of the court
below was, that if vendor and vendee
agree that possession shall go -to the
vendee but the property remain in the
vendor until the whole purchase-money is
paid, such agreement, as respects creditors and the sheriff, is fraudulent. In
affirming the judgment Chief Justice

same-a false credit is given."
be seen that Judge TILOHMCA

It will
regarded

the contract as fraudulent in law, and
used lauguage very different from that
in Afurgatroyd v. Caford; and the
only authorities referred to are Clow
v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 281, and
Babb v. Clemson, 10 Id. 419. Clow v.
TILGUMAN said': "I cannot say that I
Woods, now a leading case, was an
perceive any error in the opinion of the action of trespass against the sheriff.
The defendant in the execution under
Court of Common Pleas. Possession of
personal property is the great mark of which the sheriff made the alleged
ownership. It is almost the only index wrongful sale, had mortgaged the goods
which the world in general has to look sold-vats, tanner's tools, leather, Ac.,
to. But there are exceptions. There to the present plaintiff, the deed conare certain necessary and lawful con- taining a proviso that the goods should
tracts by which the owner parts with remain in the mortgagor's possession to
the possession, and yet fraud cannot be enable him to finish tanning the leather.
While in the possession of the mortpresumed. Such are the contracts of
lending 'and hiring, both very useful, gagor under the agreement, the goods
and without which society cannot well were levied upon to satisfy a judgment
exist. * * * No suspicion of fraud can obtained against the mortgagor by a
fairly arise where the transaction is in third person. The sheriff had notice
the usual course of business. But the of the mortgage one day prior to the
case is very different where it is in- sale. It was held that, as there had
teixded that the property should be ap- been no delivery of the mortgaged
parently in one, while it is in fact in property to the mortgagee, the mortanother. This is out of the usual course gage though good as between the parof business, unnecessary, and diitctly ties was void as to creditors, the postending to the injury of those who are not session of the mortgagor being fraud
in the secret. * * * All the world had per se. But in the course of a careful
a right to suppose that he [Michael] was opinion, Judge GiBsox said: "I can
the owner of the team which he drove, see no objection to an absolute sale of
and a secret agreement to the contrary an article undergoing -manufacture to be
was a fraud upon society, by giving the delivered when finished. * * * If,
wagoner a false credit which might however, the transacfions were ininduce others to trust him with their dustriously kept secret, it would amount
The fatal defect
property. The cases which have gen- to actual fraud."
erally been brought before the courts in Clow v. Woods, and that upon
of justice are those in which the seller which Judge Gcusox bases his decision,
has remained in possession; I will refer is that the mortgaegd goods were
particularly to Clow v. Woods and Babb not scheduled. Judge DuNcAN, who
also delivered an opinion in the same
v. Clemson. * *' * The principle which
governed them was that a sale where case, discusses the question as to whether
possession does not accompany and fol- retention of possession under such cirlow it is fraudulent as to creditors. It cumstances is fraud per se, or merely a
was the separation of the possession badge of fraud to be considered by the
jury. He says, "The distinction courts
from the property which made thefraud;
and the principle applies to the case have taken is, between a deed purporting
before us. * *, * The mischief is the on its face to be an absolute deed, so
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that the *separationof the title from the
possession is incompatible with the deed
itself, and a deed upon condition, which
does not entitle the vendee to possession.
An absolute deed without possession is
in point of law fraudulent. When possession is inconsistent with the deed, it
is a fraud in itself to be determined by
the court." This is a strong, indeed, a
direct, implication, that where the agreement and the possession are compatible,
fraud is a question for the jury. Babb
v. Clemson, 10 S. & IR.419, also cited
by Judge TILGHMAN, was a suit against

the sheriff for the value of certain goods
levied on by him. The plaintiff's claim
was based upon an assignment of the
goods to her by the defendant in the
execution prior to the levy. The defendant remained in possession after
the assignment. The point decided is
correctly stated in the syllabus, as follows: If the owner continue in possession after an absolute assignment of the
goods, it is a fraud per se, unless the
possession is according to some conditions or trust expressed in the deed.
It is upon these two cases that the decision in Martin v. Mathiot rests, and
with every respect for so able and learned
a jurist as Judge Tis.onmix,, they can
hardly be said to warrant it. Especially
in view of the earlier law in Pennsylvania, which was much less strict with
regard to fraudulent possession than
that in England: Dawes v. Cope, 4
Binu. 258; Levy v. Wallis, 4 Dall.
197 ; Waters v. M-cClellan, Id. 208;
Chancellor v. Phillips, Id. 213 ; Wilt v.
Franklin, I Binn. 502. Mlartin v.
Mlatdot practically avoids the payment
of money as a condition precedent to
the vesting of property in the vendee,
as to purchasers and creditors, where
possession has been given him. Neither
Claw v. Woods, nor any of the earlier
authorities, sustain this. All of them
except from the rule as to fraudulent
possession cases where there is a condition expressed in the deed, even though as

a matter of fact the possession is equally
deceptive in both cases.
The early
authority most nearly in point which
I have been able to find is Mlurgatroyd
v. Crawford, supra, with which Martin
v. Matdot certainly does not agree.
A strikingly similar case arose some
years later, where there had been an
agreement to sell a boat, with the condition that it should remain the vendor's
property until the instalments were
paid. The vendee was in the employ
of the vefidor as boatman. Some of
the instalments had been paid, and the
vendee was in possession. The creditors
of the vendee levied upon the boat, ad
the court below, upon the authority of
Martin v. 3Matiiot, pronounced the agreement a fraud per se, as to the vendee's
creditors. This judgment was reversed,
Judge GsBsox distinguishing Martin v.
Mllatdot, upon the ground that in the
present case, the possession of the yendee, since he was in the vendor's employ,
was the possession of the vendor, and
therefore not delusive: Lehigh Co. v.
Field, 8 W. & S. 241.
It seems decided beyond question,
in Pennsylvania, that where there
is a present sale and delivery, no
agreement to continue the property in
the vendor, or to preserve his lien, will
avail: .JenLins v. .Eicielberger, 4 Watts
121; McCullough v. Porter, 4 W. & S.
178; Trovillo v. Shiiqles, 10 Watts 438 ;
Pritchett v. Cook, 62 Penn. St. 193.
The difficulty is in determining what is
and what is not a present sale. It was
found that to apply the doctrine of Martin v. Mat/dot to all cases of the kind
would work injuriously, and before long
there appear two lines of cases, one
governed by Martin v. Afathiot,' and
limited to cases where there is a delivery to the vendee AVith retention of
title by the vendor simply for his security
or convenience, and the other composed of those cases wherein there
appears to have been some further
motive for the delivery, either that the
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vendee should have the si;e of the property as bailee for hire, with a right to
buy absolutely at the end of the.time,
or continue in possession as the servant
or agent of the vendor with the right to
pay for and become owner of the property
at a future time. The cases just cited
are examples of the first line, and to
them may be added Stadfeldt v. Huntsman and Brunswick v. Hoover, supra.
The distinction between the two lines is
clear enough in principle, hut as before
remarked, the difficulty arises when it is
proposed to apply the principle to given
circumstances. Martin v. Mathiot and
kindred cases would seem to stamp as
illegal, or more properly, void as to
third persons, any contract no matter
how worded, which gives the vendee
possession, and retains the ownership
in the vendor for his security or that
of the vendee. It has also been held in
several cases, beginning with Myers v.
Harvey, 2 P. & W. 478, that property
bought at sheriff's sale may be left with
the defendant, loaned or hired, without
subjecting to sale again as his property.
But where there is an agrecinentto resell
it to the defendant, be the sale conditional or absolute, his creditors may
again sell it: Heitzman v. Divil, II Penn.
St. 264; Dick v. Cooper, 24 Id. 217;
Waldron v. Haupt, 52 Id. 408.
. The case of Clark v. Jack, 7 Watts
375, may be said to begin the line of
cases held not within the principle of
Martin v. Mathiot. The agreement was :
"Articles (ifagreement made and concluded this 4th day of June, in the year
of our Lord 1836, between William Jack
of the one part and Richard Arthurs and
C. J. Durham of the other part, witnesseth, that in consideration of $145 paid
Lewis P. Durham for the said Jack, in
hand by the said Arthurs and Durham,
the said Jack agrees to sell two years
from this date unto the said Arthurs
and Durham all of the law library
which the said Jack bought of Lewis P.
Durham. And the said Arthurs and

Durham agree to pay a certain judgment
bond in which said Jack, Arthurs and
Durham are jointly bound unto the said
L. P. Durham for the sum of $200 with
interest, which payment shall be in full
satisfaction of the said books. And further, the said Jack agrees to let the said
Arthurs and Durham have the use of
the said books until that time, and the
said books not to be taken out of Brookville, Jefferson Co." This was held a
bailment, with a superadded contract to
sell, and the possession in no wise fraudulent. So in Rose v. Story, I Penn.
St. 190, where the agreement was for
the sale of horses to be paid for in instalments (several of which had been
paid), the animals to remain the property
of the vendor until final payment, the
contract was held valid as against the
vendee's creditors on the ground that as
he was in the employ of the vendor, and
continued to use the horses in his work
about the premises, there was nothing
deceptive in his' possession. See also
Lehigh Co. v. Field, supra. In Rowe v.
Sharp, 51 Penn. St. 26, the agreement
was a lease of billiard tables for a certain
period, lessee to redeliver them in good
condition, lessors to make out a'bill of
sale at the end of the term if there had
been no default in paying the instalments
of rent. Three days prior to the execution of the lease, the lessee agreed to
purchase the tables of the lessor 'or
He paid cash $200, and the
$750.
balance $550 was the amount mentioned
as the total rent in the lease. A bill of
sale was made out at the time of the
agreement to purchase, though not
signed. This case affords a curious
example. No one can fail to see that
the effect and intention of the lease were
simply the security of the vendor. Yet
the agreement was held lawful, and the
delivery to the lessees or vendees simply
a bailment, upon the authority of Clark
v. Jack, supra. Rowe v. Sharp is upon
the border line, and is hardly sustained,
certainly not ruled, by Clark v. Jack
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Enlow v. Klein, 79 Penn. St. 488, is also
an important case. The agreement was
that Enlow should "furnish" Mforitz with
horses, wagons, &c., suitable for peddling. Mloritz to pay him $5 per week for
two hundred weeks, the property to belong to and be managed by Enlow until
the last payment. Moritz to keep the
articles in repair, and replace any horse
which might die. Enlow to relinquish
all right to the property at the last payment. Delivery to Moritz under this
agreement was held a bailment, the
word "furnish" implying that the property was loaned or hired with a superadded agreement to sell at a future day.
The case is said to be within the principle
ruled in Rose v. Story, supra,that where
payment is to be for the use of a thing,
with an agreement for a future sale, the
contract is valid. Rose v. Story is several times cited as authority for this proposition, but it decides nothing of the kind.
There was not the slightest agreement
for the use of the property, nor was it
pretended that there was. The proposition is enunciated gratuitously in the
syllabus, but the decision rested, as
shown above, on the ground that the
vendee was in the employ of the vendor.
This is recognised as the " pivot" of the
case in Euwer v. Van Geisen, 6 Weekly
Notes Cases 364.
The two recent cases referred to at
the beginning of this note show a strong
disposition to extend the doctrine of
Martin v. Mathiot; Stadfeldt v. Huntsman closely resembled Rowe v. Sharp
and Enlow v. Klein. The difference
In Rowe
was verbal-in the "label."
v. Sharp there had been a nominal
lease. In Enlow v. Klein, a lease by
In Stafeldt v. Runtsimplication.
man, the contract was practically the
same, but expressed simply as an agreement to pay in instalments, with a
right in the vendor to take away the
goods upon default. The case is distinguished from Rowe v. ,S7ar , because
there was no lease in terms, nor was

anything said as to re-delivery. Nothing
was said as to re-delivery in .Enlow v.
Klein, but there was an implied lease.
Here there was none. Bruns'wick v.
Hoover is even more on all fours with
Rowe v. Shap.. The draftsman of the
contract, probably having the latter case
in mind, made the agreement in the
form of a sale in instalments, to be secured by lease. Subsequently, a lease
was executed by vendors to vendees,
without, however, containing in terms
an agreement to re-deliver. This arrangement the court pronounced truly a
"thin disguise,' "too clumsy to have
the merit of being clever," and held the
transaction a sale, concluding their
opinion by saying: "There is not the
slightest element of bailment in the
transaction. It is immaterial what the
parties call it, the law pays little attention to the label; it looks beneath and
examines the nature of the contract between the parties." It must be confessed that this language is hard to
reconcile with Rowev. Sharp and Enlow
v. Klein. No one can suppose for a
moment that an actual re-delivery of the
tables was contemplated in Rowe v.
,Sharp, especially in view of the evidence
of a sale prior to the lease. It was the
"tlabel" and only the labe at which the
court looked in that case. And the true
difference between it and Brunswick v.
Hoover, is that the agreement was
cleverly drawn in the one case and
clumsily in the other. The disguise is
equally evident in both. There was no
agreement whatever for a re-delivery in
Enlow v. Klein, and though the facts of
that case are not so nearly in point as in
Rowe v. Sharp, both cases show a tendency toward forsaking the doctrine of
Martin v. Mathiot-a tendency directly
the reverse of Stadfedt v. .Huntsman and
Brunswick v. Hoover. It is greatly tc
be regretted that Martin v. Hathlo'
should be returned to in the face of the
requirements of modern convenience,
and when Judge TsT.m rAN'S assertion
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in that case that such agreements " are
not in the usual course of business," is
certainly no longer true, if it ever was.
I have reviewed at length the Pennsylvania law, in order to show the fallacy
of the rule lately returned to, so strongly
evidenced by the constant exceptions to
the rule made from time to time, and the
final gradual tendency to relinquish it
altogether, until it was restored by the
two last cases. The following are interesting cases in Pennsylvaria: Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Penn. St. 431 ; Becker
v. Smith, 59 Id. 469 ; Henry v. Patterson, 57 Id. 34"6; HaaL v. Linderman,
64 Id. 501 ; Stiles v. Whitaker, 1 Phila.
271 ; Farrell v. iVathans, Id. 557 ;
Henkels v. Brown, 4 Id. 299 ; Crist v.
Kleber, 79 Penn. St. 290; Bepple v.
Speakaman, 7 Phila. 119 ; P ice . 11cCallister, 3 Grant's Cas. 2,48.
In New York, the question has arisen
with great frequency, and the decisions
are not all reconcilable, but the later
ones are opposed to the late Pennsylvania
decisions, and hold that the vendee in
such cases takes no title, nor do his
creditors, or bona fide purchasers from
him, until he has paid the price, upon
which, in the agreement, his acquisition
of title depends: Wait v. Green, 36
N. Y. 556, was in accord with the rule
in Pennsylvania, and was for some time
followed. There was no condition in
the original agreement in that case, but
at the time of delivery the condition was
annexed ; and Ballard v. Burgett, 40
N. Y. 314, and Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y.
500, are distinguished by Judge iAPALLO in Comer v. Cunningham, 77 N. Y.
391, on the ground that where the
original contract is absolute and the
delivery conditional, the doctrine of
Wait v. Green would apply, but where
the original contract is conditional, the
rule would be different. But this distinction can hardly be maintained:
Smith v. Lynes, 1 Seld. 42. And Wait
v. Green may now be considered not
law, as the judge who delivered the

opinion in the case, says, in a note to
the reporter in 20 How. Pr. 530, that
"the heresy of that case should hot be
and his colleagues
perpetuated "-he
being now convinced that their decision
had been erroneous. The vendee must
not, however, be empowered by the contract to do anything inconsistent with
his imperfect title. If, therefore, the contract contains a provision that the vendee
may resell the goods, a purchaser from
him will be protected, though the price
be not paid the original vendor: lRtzgerald v. Fuller, 19 Hun 180 ; Ludden
v. Hazen, 31 Barb. 650; Cole. M1ann,
3 T. & C. 380. The cases of .loss v.
Boon, 70 N. Y. 465; Comer v.' Cannngham, 77 Id. 391 ; Ballardv. Burgett,
40 Id. 314; Austin v. Dye, 46 Id. 500,
may be considered as settling the law in
New York and establishing the validity
of such contracts even as to bona fide
purchasers and creditors.
In New Jersey, the law coincides
with that of New York, although the
question does not seem to have arisen
until recently, and I have been able to
find but one case on the point: Cole v.
Berry, 13 Vroom 308. The authorities
are cited, and the Pennsylvania doctrine
noticed and pronounced against the
weight of authority, in an able opinion

by DiinuE, J.
The Delaware reports contain no
adjudication upon the question.
Of the New England states, in Maine
the courts go pretty far in opposition to
the Pennsylvania doctrine. The validity
of such contracts as against bonafide purchasers and creditors is beyond question
established: Sawyer v. Shaw, 9 Me. 47
Whipple v. Gilpatrick, 19 Me. 427
Tibbetts v. Towle, 12 Id. 341 ; Porter v.
Foster, 20 Id. 391 ; Leighton v. Stevens,
22 Id. 252 ; Hotehkiss v. Hunt, 49 Id.
213; Rawson v. Tue!, 47 Id. 506 ; Sawyer v. Fisher, 32 Id. 28; Brown v.
Haynes, 52 Id. 578; Everett v. Halls
67 Id. 497 ; Rogers v. Whitehouse, 71'
Id. 2 22. So different is the view taken
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by the court of Maine from that of
Pennsylvania, that an agreement that
goods shall be returned or paid for on a
day certain, with or without a provision
that in case of their return, rent shall be
paid for them, will pass the title in
Maine, and will not in Pennsylvania:

In New Hampshire the same rule
prevails, and such contracts are valid:
Ftlsk v. Even, 46 N. H. 173; Kimlball
v. Jark-man, 42 Id. 242 ; Dudley v. Sawyer, 41 Id. 326. And in that state,
where nothing is said as to payment and
delivery, there is an implied condition

Dearborav. Turner, 16 Me. 17 ; Buswell
v. Bicknell, 17 Id. 344; Perkins v.
Douglass, 20 Id. 317. And so firmly
established is the principle, that a man
may annex what conditions lie chooses
to the -ale of his property, that in a case
where A. negotiated with B. for the
sale of goods, and 0. at A.'s request
paid for them on the condition That he
was to be owner until repaid, and the
goods were delivered to A. and C.
jointly, a bona fide purchaser from A.
was not protected as against C., even
though B. supposed that he was selling
the goods to A. : Thinter v. Lombard,
53 'e.
369. And where property is
sold to remain the vendor's until wholly
paid for, if the vendee sell the property
after partial, payment, the purchaser is
not entitled to deduct this payment in an
action of trover by the original vendor.
The contract and delivery give the
vendee no right to sell the property
until the condition is absolutely performed: Brown v. Haynes, supra. The
condition is not illegal or void, even
though the vendee be given a right to
sell the goods. While the vendor,
under such circumstances, cannot recover
from purchasers to whom the goods
have been properly sold, lie can from
thd vendee or his assignee for the benefit
of creditors: Rogers v. Whitehouse,
supra. But strong as is the tendency of
the Maine cases toward protecting the
vendor in conditional sales, when it
can be shown that the sale has once been
complete by the.performance of the condition, no acknowledgment by the
vendee that the property is still the
vendor's will avail against bona fide
purchasers or creditors: George v.
Stubbs, 26 Me. 243.

that the price shall be paid before the
property shall vest, simple delivery not
being conclusive evidence of the waiver
of the condition: Ferguson v. Clifford,
37 N. H. 87. If the contract be that
the vendee shall pay for the article or for
its use, and before the day fixed he sells
his interest to a purchaser with notice,
the latter may tender the original vendor
the price and acquire the property. But
the property does not pass to the original
vendee so as to enable him to confer title
on a subsequent purchaser. His interest
is equitable merely : Sargent v. Gile, 8
N. H. 325 ; Bailey v. Colby, 34 Id. 29 ;
Esty v. Graham, 46 Id. 169. If the property has become part of land, as rails
on a railroad, subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees of the Ind will be protected; Haven v. Emery, 33 N. H. 66.
The Vermont cases establish the same
general rule. In that state, until 1854,
when the law was so far altered by
statute, an attaching creditor of the
vendee, or a purchaser from him, could
not, even by a tender of the price and
interest, defeat the vendor's right to
maintain trover: Bigelow v. Huntley,
8 Vt. 151 ; Bradley v. Arnold, "16 Id.
382; Smith v. Foster, 18 Id. 183;
Buctcmaster v. Smith. 22 Id. 203;
Martin v. Lames, 26 Id. 476 ; Child v.
Allen, 33 Id. 476.: &urd v. Fleming, 34
Id. 169 ; Burnell v. Afarvin, 44 Id. 277 ;
Duncan v. Stone, 45 Id. 118. Where,
however, the recovery of the vendor
would really enure to the benefit of the
vendee, the rule does not apply. A
distinction is taken between conditional
sales, by their terms permitting the conditional vendees to resell the goods, and
those simply permitting him to consume
them. The former are not good against
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purchasers without notice-the latter
are: Armington v. Houston, 38 Vt. 448.
The same general rule obtains in
Rhode Island: Goodell v. Fairbrother,
12 R. 1. 233.
In Massachusetts there have been
some interesting applications of the rule.
It was held in Fairbank -;. Phelps, 22
Pick. 535, that where the condition
remained unbroken, the vendor could
not maintain trover without previous
demand for the price or the goods, as his
right of possession was wanting. But
the validity of such contracts is well
established, and it has not been necessary that the condition should be very
clearly expressed, at least as against the
vendee's creditors: Hill v. Freeman, 3
Cush. 257 ; Heschorn v. Canney, 98
Mass. 149; Armour Y. Pecker, 123 Id.
143. And the distinction hinted at in
Hill v. Freeman, between creditors and
bona fide purchasers, has been done
away with in the case of Coggill v.
Railroad Co., 3 Gray 545, a leading
case on the subject in Massachusetts,
and, indeed, elsewhere, as it is frequently and approvingly cited in other
states. It does not affect the case that
the seller knew the buyer to be a dealer
in the kind of goods sold, nor will an
understanding that the goods are to be
placed in the vendee's shop for sale
enable a purchaser of the nhole stock to
hold it against the original vendor:
Sargent v. Metcalf, 5 Gray 306; Burbank v. Crookcr, 7 Id. 158. In general,
see cases already cited, and Gilbert v.
Thompson, 3 Gray 550, note; Blanchard
v. Child, 7 Id. 155 ; Deshon v. Bigelow,
8 Id. 159; Zuchtmann V. Roberts, 109
Mass. 53; Benner v. Puffer, 114 Id.
376. It is no defence to an action of
roplevin by the seller, that the defendant
lent the original vendee part of the
money paid, and afterwards tendered
the remainder of the agreed price to the
seller: Chase v. Pike, 125 Mass. 117.
But if the vendee sells the property
before all the money is paid, and after-

wards tenders the rest of the money, this
will confirm the title of the purchaser
from him: Day v. Bassett, 102 Mawss.
445; Currier v. Knapp, 117 Id. 324.
And a conditional vendee, even after
condition broken, may maintain trover
for the goods against a person becoming
wrongfully possessed of them : Hartington v. King, 121 Mlass. 269.
Such contracts have met with the
same construction in Connecticut, a fact
which is not a little remarkable in a state
where the doctrine of fraudulent possession is so strongly adhered to: Forbes
v. larsh, 15 Conn. 384; Bart v. Carpenter, 24 Id. 427. They are looked
upon as agreements for a future sale, 6r
as bailments: Todinson v. Roberts, 25
Conn. 478 ; Hn'ghes v. Kdly, 40 Id.
148 ; Brown v. Fitch,43Id. 512. And in
the principal case the court has followed
the Massachusetts cases, in holding that
the giving of authority to the vendee to
dispose of the goods before payment will
not necessarily invalidate the condition.
In the South and Southwest, the adjudications upon the poipt are not
numerous. In many of the states, statutes have been passed within the last
few years requiring contracts of the
kind to be filed and recorded. No cases
appear in Virginia, West Virginia, Florida and Texas. In the two Virginias,
a statute was passed in 1873 of the
kind just mentioned, and in Texas a
similar statute was passed in 1879.
A dictum in accord with the Pennsylvania rule appears in Carrollv. Wiggin,
30 Ark. 402, and in Bttler T. Gannon,
53 Md. 333. The law in Kentucky
corresponds with that in Pennsylvania,
and the same doctrine was adopted by
the Supreme Court of Alabama in
Sumner v. Woods, 52 Ala. 94; Dud572; Leigh v.
ley v. Abner, Id.
Railroad, 58 Id. 165, but the contrary doctrine has been recently enunciated in Fairbanks v. Eureka Co., 2
South. L. J. (N. S.) 465; see, also,
Holman v. "Lock 51 Ala. 287. North
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and South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi and Tennessee recognise the validity of conditional sales, as to all parties.
In South Carolina, the condition is void
if verbal, by Act of 1843 : Talmadge
v. Oliver, 14 S. C. 524, and cases cited.
In Woods v. Burrough, 2 Head 207, a
distinction is taken between the reservation of lien and the reservation of
ownership.
The former is invalid,
unless done under certain forms. The
latter is perfectly valid. This case
affords an admirable illustration of the
fact that lien and ownership or property
are distinct. Lien is too often regarded
as a remnant of the right of property
-such
is not the caie, and the distinction is of great importance.
It
forms the fundamental difference between cases where the vendee has and
has not the title. If lien only is reserved, the ownership is gone from the
vendor to the vendee by the very terms
of the agreement, and the result is, of
course, entirely different. The accidental loss of the thing sold must be
borne by the conditional vendee: Bank
v. Vandyck, 4 Heisk. 617. This point
is, however, left undecided in Georgia:
Bentley v. Johnson, 63 Ga. 661.
In
Georgia, resale by a conditional vendee
is a conversion, and the vendor may
sue in trover at once, although the time
for payment has not yet arrived : Sims
v. James, 62 Ga. 260. See, generally,
Ballew v. Sudderth, 10 Ired. 176 ; Parris v. Roberts, 12 Id. 268 ; Ellison v.
Jones, 4 Id. 48 ; Smith v. Sasser, 5
Jones 388; Talmadge v. Oliver, 14 S.
C. 524; Houston v. Dyche, Mleigs 76;
Gambling v. Read, Id. 281 ; Price v.
Jones, 3 Head. 84; Holmark v. Molin,
5 Cold. 482; Bradshaw v. Thomas, 7
Yerg. 497 Ketchum v. Brennan, 53
Miss. 596; Vaughnv. Hapson, 10 Bush
338; expressly overruling Patten v.
McCane, 15 B. Mon. 558; Greer v.
Church, 13 Bush 430; Goodwin v. May,
23 Ga. 205; Flanders v. Huguenin, 58
Ga. 56.
VoL. XXX.-30

The law of Ohio is opposed to the
Pennsylvania doctrine: Carmack v. Gordon, 2 Cin. S. C. It. 408.
So in Indiana: Hanway v. Wallace,
18 Ind. 377; Dunbar v. Rawle, 28 Id.
225 ; Bradshaw v. lVarner, 54 Id. 58 ;
Thomas v. Winters, 12 Id. 322; Hodson
v. UWarner, 60 Id. 214; ,cGin v. Sell,
60 Id. 249. In Kiny v. Wilkins, 11
Ind. 349, it was said that the vendor
could not set up his title as against a
creditor who had trusted the vendee on
the faith of the goods. But this is disapproved in Bradshaw v. Warner, supra.
Mere endorsement of a note for the payment of the price, containing a stipulation that the article is to remain the
vendor's until full payment, will not
vest the property in the endorsee so as
to enable him to maintain replevin
against the vendee.
It is doubtful
wbether the vendor's reservation of property is assignable: Domestic S. M. Co.
v. Arthurhultz, 63 Ind. 322.
The Pennsylvania doctrine obtains in
Illinois : Ketchumv. Watson, 24 ll. 592;
McCormick v. Hadden, 37 Id. 370;
Murch v. Wright, 46 Id. 487. And the
case of Lucas v. Campbell, 88 Id. 447,
would seem to go farther and to suggest
that as between the parties, the property
is in the vendee (see pages 450, 451),
but the question in the case was as to
the vendee's attaching creditor. This
case is an example of the prevalent
manner of drawing contracts for the sale
of sewing machines on the instalment
plan ; such a contract is held to be a
sale in Illinois: Lathaam v. Sumner, 89
Ill. 234. In Young v. Bradley, 68 Id.
557, it is broadlj stated that the law of
Illinois is, that a delivery of personalty
under a contract of sale by an unpaid
vendor to a vendee passes the title, as to
innocent purchasers, irrespective of the
particular terms of the contract or the
intention of the parties: Jennings v.
Gage, 13 IIl. 610; and Brundage v.
Camp, 21 Id. 330, are leading authorities for this proposition.
A careful
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perusal of them, particula'ly the earlier one, will show that, as applied
to these facts, they hardly, go so far.
Subsequent cases, hiowever, clearly establish the law as above stated: Sibley
v. Tie, 88 Il1. 287; H. C. Railroad
Co. v. Phlllips, 60 Id. 190.
Tie opposite rule prevails in Michigad: Couse v. Tregent, l1 Mich. 65;
Dunlaj v. Gleason, 16 Id. 158; Whitney v. 21cConnell, 29 Id. 14.
In Wisconsin, the Act of 1873 makes
all agreements of the kind void as
to creditors, unless properly filed and
It is doubted in Kimball
recorded.
v. Post, 44 Wis. 471, whether if the
agreement takes the form of a lease it is
within the statute, but the court incline
strongly to the opinion that it is.
A like statute was passed the same year
in M'innesota. The case most nearly in
point is fMcClelland v. Nicilols, 24 Minn.
176.
In Iowa the validity of these contracts was recognised by the courts,
although originally with one dissent out
of three judges : Baileyv. farris,8 Iowa
331 ; Robinson v. Chapline, 9 Id. 91 ;
Baker v. Hall, 15 Id. 277 ; Knoulton v.
Redenbaugh, 40 Id. 114; Ilhosely r.
Shattuck, 43 Id. 540. -By Act of 1872,
Code, sect. 1922, sales of this kind must
be in writing and recoidad to avail
against creditors and purchasers, and
the recording must be with due promptness: Push v. Weston, 52 Iowa 675.
The act is not retrospective: Knowlton
v. Bedenbaugh, Mosely v. Shattuck,
supra.
There have been one or two remarkable rulings in Missauri recently.
The cases of Parmlee v. Catherwood, 36
Mo. 479 ; Grf~in v. Pagh, 44 Id. 326 ;
.Little v. Page. Id. 412; Ridgway v.
Kennedy, 52 Id. 24, settled the law of
that state in opposition to the Pennsylvania doctrine. In 1877 the legislature
passed an act avoiding such sales as to
third persons unless recorded, etc.
(Sect. 2507, R. S.)
Since then, Bob-

bins v. Pillips,68 Mo. 100; Wangler
v. Franklin, 70 Id. 659; Sumner v.
Cottey, 71 Id. 121 ; Dwyer v. Denny,
6 Mo. App. 578; Willard Y. Sumner,
7 Id. 577, have been decided, and the
doctrine of Parmlee v. Catherwood distinctly reiterated. The cases of Bobbins
v. Phidlips and Sumner v. Cottey arose
before the passage of the act. It is not
stated.when the facts of the other cases
occurred ; but the rule is reiterated in
the strongest way, record is pronounced
unnecessary, and the Act of 1877 not
even alluded to. The only statutory
enactment mentioned is sect..5, p. 280,
1 Wag. Stat. (1870), which was less
express, and held not to apply. There
is doubtless some reason for this apparent direct conflict, but it is perplexing,
at least, to the outside reader.
These contracts are valid in Kansas:
Hall v. Draper, 20 Kans. 137.
An act passed in 1877 in Nebraska
requires conditional sales to be re-i
corded, etc.; prior to that time they
were held valid: Aultman v. Mallory, 5 Neb. 180. They are valid in
California, Oregon and Nevada: Kohler
v. Hayes, 41 Cal. 455 ; Singer M3anuf.
Co. v. Graham, 8 Oregon 17; Cardinal
v. Edwards, 5 Nevada 36. The question has not been before the courts of
Colorado.
Two recent decisions in point appear in the United States Supreme
Court Reports: Hervey v. Locomotive
Works, 3 Otto 664, where the case arose
in Illinois, and in conformity with the
law of that state, as shown above, the
contract was held invalid as to third
persons without notice,.and Heryford v.
Davis, 12 Otto 235, a case which arose
in Missouri, and in which the contract
was held invalid as not having been
recorded under the chattel mortgage acts
of that state. The facts occurred before
1877, so that the statute of that date
would not apply; but counsel, arguendo, asserted. that the law "1was, and
now is," that such contracts are per-

2

SONSTIBY v. KEELEY.
fectly valid inlMissouri. Justice BRADLEYzdissents strongly, and advocates the
liberal construction of contracts of this
nature, and his views are certainly borne
out by the increasing number of conditional sales in various forms, of which
the "instalment plan" of selling sewing
machines, and "car trusts," are examples. Such contracts bid fair to
become quite as much in the usual course
of business as the long-recognised con-

tracts of hiring, bailments for storage,
etc. And no reason can be shown why
the possession is more or less deceptive
in the one case than in the other. The
great weight of authority, as we have
seen, is against the last two Pennsylvania cases, and it is to be hoped that
the Supreme Court of that state will not
long continue to occupy its present nearly
unique position.
Lucius S. LANiDE5TH.

United States Circuit Coart, District of ilfinnesota.
SONSTIBY v. KEELEY.
In cases of conflict between the decisions of the federal courts and those of the.
state courts, the former will, even on questions of commercial law, follow the decisions of the state courts if it appears that, by reason of the situation of the parties
and of the subject-matter, a contrary ruling would subject a party to a double payment of the same debt, without the possibility of relief from the federal courts.
In a suit in a federal court, a sale made in Mlinnesota was attacked on the ground
of the vendor's fraud, and it appeared that part of the consideration was an agreeInent by the vende. to assume the payment of a debt of the vendor to a third person,
which agreement would, under the rulings of the Minnesota courts, render the
vendee liable to such Third person therefor. Held, that the federal court would
treat the assumption of such debt as a valid consideration.
Whether, in an action at law involving the validity of a sale, the court can
apply the equitable principle that an innocent vendee who, subsequent to the sale,
has received notice of the vendor's fraud will be protected only to the extent of the
portion of the consideration paid prior to the receipt of such liotice : Qucere.

MOTION for a new trial.

This was an action at law arising out of a sale of certain property by one Forbes to the plaintiff, and its subsequent seizure as
the property of Forbes under attachment proceedings.

It ap-

peared that, prior to September 1878, Forbes was the owner of a
stock of dry goods in a store at Waseca, Minnesota.

On the 17th

of that month he executed a bill of sale of said stock of goods to
the plaintiff, and delivered to him possession. This was done by
virtue of an agreement of sale, made without any fraudulent intent

on the part of plaintiff, and without any knowledge by him of any
such intent on the part of Forbes, by which agreement plaintiff
paid Forbes for the goods $3000 in cash, and assumed the payment of certain debts held by 9 bank in Wasec a against Forbes,
amounting to about $3800. This agreement was made, or at least
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repeated, in the presence of the cashier of the bank, to whom a
list of the debts was exhibited, with the statement that plaintiff
had agreed to pay them. There was no proof of any agreement
,of the bank to look to plaintiff or to release Forbes, except the
proof that the cashier was advised of and assented to the arrangement. Subsequently to the delivery of possession to plaintiff, the
sheriff, by virtue of certain writs of attachment against Forbes,
levied upon and took possession of the goods as the -property of
Forbes, under the claim that the sale to plaintiff was void because
made to hinder, delay and defraud creditors. One of the questions raised in the present case was, whether if there was fraud on
thepart of Forbes, the assumption of the bank debts by plaintiff
was binding upon him, and therefore equivalent to a cash payment,
or whether it did not bind him, and therefore he was to be protected only to the extent of the actual cash paid? The court
charged that the agreement to assume the debts rendered plaintiff
liable to the bank, and therefore was equivalent to the payment
of so much money. This ruling was the ground for the motion
for a new trial.
Wilson &' Gale and Rogers

Rogers,
_
for the motion.

.K. Davis, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MCORARY, 0. J.--I have grave doubts as to the propriety of
attempting to apply to a case at law the principle invoked by
counsel for defendant. in this case. That principle is, that where
a vendee buys in good fith, and without notice of fraud on the
part of the vendor, and pays a part only of the consideration,
agreeing to pay the remainder at a future day, if, before such
remainder is paid, he receives notice of the vendor's fraud, he will
be protected only to the amount actually paid before notice. No
doubt this is sound principle in equity; but can it be applied by a
court of law ? Can such a court rescind the contract pro tanto,
and place the parties in statu quo? If so, can it be done in a
case like the present, in which no issue is made except upon the
validity of the sale? If the sale was held void, so as to leave the
title-in Forbes, against whom the attachments were issue&, judgment at law could be rendered for defendant; but where the sale
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is found to be valid and bona fide, so \far as the vendee is concerned, and the title is vested in him, and where he has sold or
disposed of a po'tion of the stock, and probably expended money
and given time and labor in its care and preservation, it seems
probable that only a court of equity would be competent to grant
any relief to the creditors of the vendor.
But it is not necessary to pass finally upon this question,. as I
am clearly of the opinion that the proof shows a payment by
plaintiff of the whole of the purchase price. It is contended that
the promise by plaintiff to assume and pay the indebtedness of
Forbes at the bank, though made as a part of the consideration
for the purchase, was not payment, and this for the reason that
plaintiff is not legally bound to pay those debts. It is-said that
the holders of those claims cannot sue plaintiff and recover upon
them. Upon this question there is a conflict of authority in this
country. In many of the states the right of action by the payee
of such debts against the party assuming to pay them is maintained, even where such payee is not party to the contract.
This is upon the ground that such a promise is an original
promise, based upon a valuable consideration, namely, the sale and
delivery of the goods: 1 Pars. Cont. (5th ed.) 466-468; Panley
v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432; Same v. Same, Id. 639; @inal Co. v.
Bank, 4 Duer 97; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Arnold v.
.Lyman, 17 Mass. 400; Carnigie v. Morrison, 2 Met. 404;
Crocker v. Stone, 7 Cush. 338; Hynd v. ffoldship, 2 Watts 104;
Burs v. Robinson, 9 Barr 229; -Eddy v. Roberts, 17 Ill. 508;
Todd v. Tobey, 29 Me. 219 ; Motley v. 1fanufacturing Ins. Co.,
Id. 837 ; Metcalf on Cont. 205-11, and cases cited in notes.
And such is the law in Minnesota, as repeatedly decided by the
Supreme Court of that state: Sanders v. Clason, 13 Minn. 379;
Goetz v. Foos, 14 Id. 265; Merriam v. Lumber Co., 23 Id. 314.
But the opposite doctrine is maintained by numerous cases, and
among them, by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Nat.
Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123; 2 Chitty Cont. (11th ed.)
74, and cases cited in notes; Mellon v. Wltipple, 1 Gray 317.
Ordinarily, this court would feel bound to adopt and follow the
rule laid down by the Supreme Court in National Bank v. Grand
Lodge, supra,- but, under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, I am clearly of the opinion that I ought to apply the
rule established by the Supreme Court of the state of Minnesota.
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It will be observed that the plaintiff assumed and agreed, in consideration of the sale to him of the stock of goods, &c., to pay
certain debts held ty the bank against Forbes. In so far as the
debts are the property of the bank, it is certain that they can be.
sued upon only in the state courts.; for it appears that the bank is
a corporation of the state of Minnesota, and the plaintiff a citizen
of that state. How many of these debts belong to the bank, and
how many to other parties represented by the bank, and how many
of such other parties are citizens of Minnesota, does not appear,
nor is it material; it is enough to say that certainly a part, and
probably the whole, of said debts could only be collected by suit in

the state courts. It may be that some of the claims are less than
$500, and for that reason not within the jurisdiction of this court.
I must assume, therefore, that, in case plaintiff refuses to pay said
claims, suits must be brought certainly upon some of them, and
probably upon all of them, in the courts of Minnesota.
. So far as those courts are concerned, as already seen, the law is
settled by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, and; in accordance therewith, the plaintiff would be held liable in a suit by the
payee of any of said debts. The question, therefore, is, shall this
court hold that the creditors of Forbes are entitled to recover from
plaintiff the sum of those debts, in this case, and thus subject him
to a second payment of the. same amount to the holders of the
claims ?
A decision which would establish such injustice as this is not, I
am sure, required at my hands. It is true that this case does not
belong to the class in which, as a rule, the federal courts are
required to follow the decisions of the highest judicial tribunal of
the state. But, although the question is a new one, I am clearlyof the opinion -that, even, on questions purely of commercial law,
the federal courts should follow those decisions if it appears that,.
by reason of the situation of the parties and of the subject-matter,
to hold otherwise would subject a party to double payment of the
same debt without the possibility of relief from the federal courts.
The motion for a new trial is overruled.
It is proposed to indicate the extent
and limitations of the rule, that "The
laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of
the United States shall otherwise require.

or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the
courts of the United States in cases
where they apply:" Jud. Act 1784,
sect. 34 (Rev. Stat. U. S., sect. 721).

SONSTIBY v. KEELBY.
I. Exceptions.

highest court of a state upon a pilot law

UNITED
STATES
CONSTITUTION,
STATUTES AND TREATIES.-The laws of

is binding upon the federal courts-and

the several states are not rules of decision
for the federal courts in cases where the
Constitution, treaties or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide. See Denn v. Harnden, I Paine
55.
SPECIAL CASE.-A case gotten up in
a state court for the purpose of anticipating a decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States, on a question
known to be pending before it, would
not necessarily be followed. This is
intimated obiter in Pease v. Peck, I8
How. 595. But East Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S. 255, holds that the
Supreme Court of the United States,
when shown a decision of a state
Supreme Court construing a state statute,
will not entertain the objection that the
cause in which it was rendered was a
fictitious one, and decline to follow the
decision as not genuinely contested.
PRIVATE ACTs.-In Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, a case in which the
Supreme Court of Alabama bad constraed the charter of an insurance conpany, holding it violated by a transaction leading to a mortgage, it was held
that such construction of the charter by
the state court would be followed ; but,
subsequently, in Williamson v. Berry,
8 How. 495, it was held that tie
Supreme Court of the United States
would not be bound by a state court's
construction of a private act, the act in
this case being one for the discharge and
appointment of a trustee in a certain
case.
CRIMINAL LAws.-Nor are the crimi-

nal laws of a statd to be followed by the
federal courts: United States v. Reid,
12 How. 361.
AsDnrtALTr.-State laws are not of
binding force in cases in admiralty:
Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 268. But in
The Princess Alexandra, 8 Ben. 209, it
was held that the construction put by the

this, notwithstanding a different construction had been previously put upon

the law by the United States Supreme
Court.
EQUITY.-Nor in equity: Russell v.
Southard, 12 How. 139 ; lcves Y. Scott,
13 Id. 268. But see Ring v. St. Lois,
5 Wall. 413, where it was held that a
non-resideni complainant can ask no
greater relief in the courts of the United
States than he could obtain were he to
resort to the state courts, and that, if in
the latter courts equity would afford no
relief, neither will it in the former.
PLEADINGS AND PRACTIcE.-State
rules relating to pleadings and procedure
are not within the meaning of the 34th

section, although by another emactment:
Sect. 914, Rev. Stat. U. S. (Act June
1st 1872; sect. 5), they are made rules
for the guidance of the Circuit and District courts of the United States within
the several states. See Robinson v.
Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 ; Fenn v. Holme,
21 How. 481 ; Sheirburn v. Cordova, 24
Id. 423; Woynzan v. Southard, 10
Wheat. 1; Brown v. Van Braam, 3
fDll. 351.: Atlantic, 6'c., Railroad Co.
v. Hoplins, 94 U. S. I1 ; Chemung, 6-c.,
Co. v. Lowcery, 93 Id. 72.
GENERAL

TuRIsPnuDExcE.-(a.)

Commercial law.-The federal courts refuse to be bound by decisions of the
state tribunals in cases involving questions of general jurisprudence, and especially in cases involving 'questions of
commercial law. Thus, in Williams v.
Suffoll Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 270, 277, concerning the rule causa proxima non
remota speetalur, STORY, J., held that
"this doctrine being founded not upon
local law, but upon the general principles
of commercial law, would be obligatory
upon this court, even if the decisions of
the state court of Massachusetts were to
the contrary; for upon commercial questions of a general nature the courts of
the United States possess the same
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general authority which belongs to the
state tribunals, and are not bound by
the local decisions. They are at liberty
to consult their own opinions, guided
indeed by the greatest deference for the
acknowle'dged learning and ability of
the state tribunals, but still exercising
their own judgment as to the reasons on
which those judgments are founded."
And see Focroft v. fallete, 4 How.
353, 379.
In Swill v. Tyson, 16 Pet. I, it was
decided that, admitting that by the law
of New York a pre-existing debt was not

a valuable consideration fbr the transfer
of an accepted bill, this rule was not
obligatory upon the federal court, which
therefore held that a pre-existing debt
did constitute a valuable consideration
in the sense of the rule protecting bona
fide holders for value and without
notice.
The same principle was recognised in
Carpenter v. The Providence, 6c., Ins.
Co., 16 Pet. 495, 511, Mr. Justice
STONY

holding that

"we

have not

thought it necessary upon this occasion
to go into an examination of the eases
cited from the New York and Massachusetts reports, either upon this last
point or upon the former point. The
decisions in those cases are certainly
open to some of ihe grave doubts and
difficulties suggested at the bar as to
their true bearing and results. The circumstances, however, attending them are
distinguishable from those of the case
now before us, and they certainly cannot be admitted to govern it. The
questions under our consideration are
questions of general commercial law,
and depend upon the contruction of a
contract of insurance which is by no
means local in its character, or regulated
by any local, policy or customs. Whatever respect, therefore, the decisions of
state tribunals may have on such a subject, and they certainly are entitled to
great respect, they cannot conclude the
judgment of this court. On the con-

trary, we are bound to interpret this
instrument according to our own opinions of its true intents and objects, aided
by all the lights which can be obfained
from all external sources whatsoever,
and if the result to which we have
arrived differs from that of these learned
state courts, we may regret it, but it
cannot be permitted to alter our judgment."
In Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 546,
slaves were held sufficient consideration
for a note, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court of Louisiana had held otherwise.
And see Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall.
354; Robinson v. Ins. "Co., 3 Sumn.
220; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger,
2 Curtis 322.
The opinion of Judge McCGmtu in
the principal case admits the rule to be
that the federal will not necessarily
follow the state courts in deciding questions of commercial law, but excepts the
principal case from the operation of the
rule on the ground that to do otherwise
might subject the plaintiff to a double
liability. This certainly appears equitable; for were the plaintiff sued by the
bank in the state court, a plea of former
recovery could not protect him, since the
bank was not a party to the suit in the
federal court, and therefore could not be
coticluded by its action. Had the bank
been a party and then sought to subject
the plaintiff to a second liability, it
would seem that a plea of former recovery would avail the latter, or that he
might have procured an injunction from
the federal court restraining the bank
from proceeding at the state court. See
French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250; FYisk
v.
U. P. Railroad Co., 10 Blarchf. 518.
Federal courts will not follow decisions of state courts where 'so to do
would impair the obligation of contracts: Gilpeke v. Dubuque, I Wall.
175. In this case, by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa
prior to that of lowa v. Wapello, 13
Iowa 388, the right of the legislature

SONSTIBY v. KEELEY.
of that state to authorize municipal corporations to subscribe to railroads extending beyond the limits of the city or
county, and to issue bonds accordingly,
was settled in favor of the right; and it
was held that those decisions meeting
with the approbation of this (the federal
supreme) court, and being in harmony
with the adjudications of sixteen states
of the Union, will be regarded as a true
interpretation of the Constitution and
laws of the state so far as relate to bonds
issued and put upon the market during
the time that those decisions were in
fact," said the court,
force. "The
"that the Suprcme Court of Iowa now
hold that those decisions were erroneous,
and ought not to have been made, and
that the legislature of the state had no
such power as former courts decided that
they had, can have no effect upon transactions in the past, however it may affect
those in the future."
And to the same
effect, see Havezeyer v. Iowa County, 3
Wall. 294; Kenosha v. Laison, 9 Id.
477 ; Alcott v. Supervisors, 16 Id. 678;
Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Id. 270;
Lamed v. Burlington, Id. 275 ; Delmas
v. Ins. Co., 14 Id. 661.
But see Stone
v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181.
And the U. S. Supreme Court affirms
its right to construe a state statute independently of the state courts when
such statute in fact amounts to a contract : efferson Branch Bank v. Skelly,
I Blk. 436; Bridge Proprietors v.
Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 145.
And where a question involved in the
construction of state statutes practically
affects the remedies of creditors which
are protected by the Constitution, this
court will exercise its own judgment
on the meaning ef the statutes, irrespectively of the decisions of the state
courts, and if it deems those decisions
wrong, will not follow them. A remedy
which the statutes of a state on what
this court considers a plainly right construction of them, give for the enforcement of contracts, cannot be taken away,
VOL. XXX.-31

as respects previously existing contracts,
by judicial decisions of the state courts
construing the statutes wrongly : Butz v.
Afuscatine, 8 Wall. 575.
(b.) Other Cases.-And in cases of
general jurisprudence other than those
Involving questions of commercial law,
the decisions of the state courts will not
necessarily be followed.
Thus, in Chicago v. Bobbins, 2 Black
418, the city of Chicago sought to recover from Robbins indemnity for damages recovered against it because of an
injury to one who had fallen into a hole
negligently left open and unguarded by
Robbins. The Supreme Court of Illinois had previously decided a case similar
to Chicago v. Bobbins, laying down a
rule as to negligence in omitting to cover
an opening in an area to which the
federal Supreme Court disagreed. It
was urged that tme decision in the state
court must be followed, but the court,
by 'Mr. Justice DAVIs, held that "1 where
private rights are to be determined by
the hpplication of common-law rules
alone, this court, although entertaining
for state tribunals the highest respect,
does not feel bound by their decisions."
tomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumn. 170, holds
that the federal courts are not bound in
the interpretation of deeds by the local
adjudications of a particular state.
And where a question arises under a
compact between two states, the rule of
decision is not to be collected from the
decisions of either state, but is one of a
national character: Marlatt v. Silk, 1I
Pet. 1.
IL Cases within the tule.
CASES INVOLVING STATE

CONSTITU-

TIONAL P.RovxsioNs.-Thus, in South
Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, the Supreme Court of the United States followed the Supreme Court of Illinois in
deciding that under the Constitution of
1848 of that state, a statute thereof is not
valid unless the legislative journals show
its passage by a majority of all the mem-
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bers-elect in each house of the General
Assembly.
In Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812,
the same court followed the Supreme
Court of Michigan in deciding that
under a constitutional provision forbidding the legislature from "passing any
act of incorporation unless with the assent of at least two-thirds of each
house," the judgment of the legislature
is required to be exercised upon the propriety of creating each particular corporation, and two-thirds of each house
must sanction and approve each individual charter. And see County of
Leavenworth v. Barnes, 94 U. S. 70.
In Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, two
governments having been in existence in
Rhode Island, viz. : the old charter
government and a new one formed by
a convention of the people, and the
courts of that state having recognised
the former as valid, it was held that the
federal court would adopt and follow the
state court's decision; and see Webster
v. Cooper, 14 How. 504.
CASEs INVOLVING STArE STATUTES.
(a.) Miscellaneous Statutes.-It is to be
remarked that where a stale adopts a statute from another country, the decisions
of such other -country construing such
statute are entitled to great consideration, but cannot be considered as conclusive upon the construction of the law ;
if the doctrines of the courts of the state
adopting the statute be irreconcilable
with those of the courts of the former
country, the state court's decisions will
be followed and the others disregarded:
Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351.
In Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 433,
where a state court-interpreting a statute of its own state, wieh gave such
court jurisdiction to subject legal and
equitable interests in real estate to the
claims of creditors--decided that the
statute embraced trusts like the one in
question (which judgment-creditors were
seeking to set aside), and that it exempted the property embraced by the

trust from the claims of creditors, the
Federal Supreme Court followed that
construction of the statute and sustained
the trust, though it 'remarked that if the
question had been treated by it on general principles of jurisprudence, and independently of the state decisions on the
statute, ie judgment would necessarily
have been the other way.
In Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18
How. 497, it was held by the Supreme
Court of the United States, that its
habit had been to defer to the decisions
of the judicial tribunals of the states
upon questions arising out of the common law of the state (compare this with
Chicago v. Bobbins, supra), especially
when applied to the title in land.
Therefore, where the Supreme Court
of Louisiana had decided questions relating to the jurisdiction of the District
Court of the First Judicial District of
the state over the succession of a debtor
who was enjoying a respite from the
claims of his creditors for a certain time,
and died before the time expired; to the
mode in which jurisdiction should be
exercised ; to the propriety of collaterally attacking a sale made by its authority; to the point whether or not the
death of the party transferred the proceedings to the Court of Probate; and
the mode in which the Court of Probate
should exercise its jurisdiction; the
Federal Supreme Court held that it
would adopt these decisions-especially
where many of them concurred with its
own judgments upon the same or similar
points.
A state decision that the statute requires the payment of taxes in gold and
silver coin, will be followed: Lane Co.
v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 ; and see Smith
v. Hunter, 7 How. 738.
Rules of evidence prescribed by the
laws of a state, are to be followed, e. g.
s statute allowing a party to testify in
his own behalf: Vance v. Campbell, 1
Black 427 ; Haussknecht v. Claypool, I
Id. 431.
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(b.) Statutes of Frauds.-In DeWolf
v. Rabaud, 1 Pet. 476, the courts of
New York were followed in holding that
under the Statute of Frauds, the consideration of the promise must appear
in the writing.. In Summer v. Hicks, 2
Black 532, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, that, under the
statute as to fraudulent conveyances, an
assignment was vitiated by a provision
authorizing the assignee to dispose of the
property assigned, "upon such terms
and conditions as in his judgment may
appear best, and most for the interest
of the parties concerned."
In United States Bant, v. Daniel, 12
Pet. 32, a decision of the Kentucky
court holding that a statute of that state
giving ten per cent. damages for a failure to pay a bill of exchange, applied
only to foreign bills.
Beach v. Viles, 2 Pet. 675, follows
the local court's construction of a statute giving a particular remedy in the
nature of foreign attachment against
garnishees who possess goods, effects
or credits of the principal debtor.
U. S. v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124, follows
a decision of the Court of Appeals, Virginia, that, under "the execution-law' of
that state, the right to take out an elegit
was not suspended by suing out afi.fa.
(c.) Statutes of Limitation.-Bell v.
.Morrison, I Pet. 351, follows the Supreme Court of Kentucky as to what
kind of a new promise will take a debt
out of the statute. Henderson v. Griffin,
5 Pet. 151, follows the South Carolina
Supreme Court in construing two limitation acts together. And where the
original manuscript of the laws for the
territory of Michigan left out the saving IIbeyond seasII in the statute, but
the published law contained this exception, and the statute, as thus published,
had been acknowledged by the people,
and had received a harmonious interpretation for a long series of years, it
was held that the phrase "beyond seas"
ought to be considered a part of the

statute: Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595.
And see Shelby v. Guy, 11 Whiat. 361 ;
Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628. Sdpp
v. Miller'sHeirs, 2 Wheat. 316, 325, follows the Kentucky court in construing
a statute allowing infants and fermes
covert three years after removal of disabilities to complete surveys on entries
of land by them, and holding that joint
entries of land were within the statute
if one of the joint owners be infant or
a feme covert. Lefulngwell v. Warren,
2 Black 603, follows the Wisconsin
court in holding possession under a
defective tax-deed adverse, and that,
if continued for a sufficient time, it
would bar ejectment. -And see M.IcCluny
v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270; Ross v. Dural,
13 Id. 45; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How.
488; Green v. Lessee of Areal, 6 Pet.
291 ; Amory v. Lawrence, 3 Cliff. 523;
Tioga Railroad Co. v. Blossbury, 20
Wall. 137.
(d.) Statutes concerning Lands.-U.
S. v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124, follows the
Virginia Court of Appeals in holding
a judgment a lien upon the debtor's real
estate. MaKeen v. Delancy's Lessee, 5
Cranch 23, 32, follows state construction
holding that, under a statute requiring
deeds to be ackuowledged before a justice of the peace, an acknowledgment
before a justice of the Supreme Court
would be valid.
Bodley v. Taylor, 2 Cranch 191, 220,
follows the state court in holding that
a court of equity might be resorted to
in order to set up an equitable against
a legal title; and see Taylor v. Brown,
5 Cranch 255; Massie v. Watts, 6 Id.
164. Thatcherv. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119,
follows the state construction of a
statute regulating the sale of lands
for delinquent taxes.
Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, follows the Kentucky court in liresuming that, under a
land law prescribing that surveys should
be recorded within three months from
the time of their being made, surveys
had been recorded after three months
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from their date. And a state court's
construction of a will will be followed
Jackcson v. Chew, 12 V]eat. 153; Carroll
v. Carroll'sLessee: 16 How. 275. But
this is only where such construction by
a state court has been long acquiesced
in, so as to become a rule of property;
otherwise, the state court's construction
of a will need not nece.sarily be followed: Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464, 476.
Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r, 1 Black 603,
holds that after a citizen of Kentucky
has become the grantee of a ferry franchise and his riparian rights have been,
by the highest legal tribunal of the state,
repeatedly held sufficient to sustain the
grant, the same question is not open to
decision by the federal Supreme Court,
the adjudications of the state courts
being a rule of property and of decision
which it is bound to recognise.' State
decisions construing recording acts must
be followed: Townsend v. Todd, 91 U. S.
452. State constructions of statutes of
descent will also be followed : Gardner
v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58; and of an act
abolishing estates tail: Fan Rennselaer
v. IKearney. 11 How. 2)7 ; and see
U. S. v. Fbx, 94 U. S. 315; and of
the phrase "tide lands" in a state
statute: Walker v. State Harbor Conmissioners, 17 Wall. 648. Christy v.
Pridgeen, 4 Wall. 196, holds that "the
Mexican colonization law of August 18tIh
1824, though general to the republic of
Mexico, was, so far as it affected lands
within the limits of Texas, after the
independence of that country, a local
law of the new state, a5 much so as
if it had originated in her legislation.
The interpretation, therefore, placed on
it by the highest court of that state must
be accepted as the true interpretation
so far isit applies to titles to lands in
tat state, whatever may be the opinion
of this court as to its original soundness.
If in courts of other states carved out
of the territory since acquired from
Mexico a different interpretation .has
been adopted the courts of the United

States will follow the different ruling
so far as it affects titles in those states.
The interpretation within the jurisdiction of a state of a local law becomes a
part of that law, as much so as if incorporated in the body of it by the legislature. If different interpretations are
given in different states to a similar law,
that law, in effect, becomes by the interpretations, so far as it is a rule of action
for this court, a different law in the one
state from what it is in the other."
It is, therefore, a rule of-general jurisprudence, as well as of statute, that the
federal will follow the state courts in
expounding purely local laws. See all
the cases spra, and IVilliamson v. Berry,
8 How. 495 ; Rice v. Railroad Co., I
Black 374; Teter v. Hewitt, 22 How.
352; Webster v. Cooper, 14 Id. 504 ;
U. S. v. Garlinyhouse, 4 Ben. 205;
Lamborn v. Dickinson County Comanisszoners, 97 U. S. 181 ; Railroad Cos.
v. Gaines, Id. 697 ; Cass County v. Jolston, 95 Id. 360 ; Hall v. De Cuir, Id.
485; Davis v. Indiana, 94 Id. 792 ;
Venice v. Murdock, 92 Id. 494 ; Nelson
v. Foster, 5 Biss. 44 ; Oliver v. Omaha,
3 Dill. 368.
Besides decisions construing a statute,
state decisions as to the repeal of a statute must be followed: Bailey v. 3 Iagwire,
'22 Wall. 215.
in5. Evidence of the Laws.
Statutes are of course evidence of the
laws, and any state may prescribe, by
its constitution or laws, what shall be
conclusive evidence of its statutes. But
the question as to the existence or nonexistence of a statute is a judicial one,
decidable by the court alone: South
Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 261.
Decisions of the courts of final resort
are likewise evidentiary of the laiw. But
mere dicta of such courts are not: Carroll i. Carroll's Lessee, 16 How. 275.
And the decisions must be "fixed."
It is "the latest settled adjudications"
that are binding: efflngwell v. Warren,
2 Black 599 ; such as may prove but
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mere "oscillations"
in the course of
judicial settlement will not necessarily
control: Gelpelce v. Dubuque, 1 Wall.

ment of the United States Circuit Court
which, when rendered, followed a decision of the state court, such decision
175 ; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 ; having been overruled by the state court
Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 85. But see after the United States Circuit Court
had rendered its decision. The Supreme
King v. Wilson, I Dill. 555.
Where the decisions of a state are Court said that the later decision of the
inconsistent, the latest will be followed:
state could not have a retroactive effect
Green v. Lessee of Nleal, 6 Pet. 291
upon the decisions of the Circuit Court,
Lefingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599;
and make that erroneous which was not
except where to follow the latest de- so when the judgment of that court was
cisions would impair the obligations of a given. And see Pease v. Peck, 18 How.
contract: Gdpelke v. Dubuque, supra.
595, 599; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 Id.
And in A1organ v. Curtenius, 20 How.
134.
1,the Supreme Court of the United States
held that it would not reverse a judg-
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
SEAMAN v. THE COMMONWEALTH.
Under a penal statute prohibiting worldly employment on Sunday, one whose
business is carried on upon that day by his employee, under his authority, is liable
to the penalty.
In such case defendant may be convicted upon evidehc that his store was open
on Sunday; that an employee was making sales, and that defendant himself was
present in the store part of the day.

CERTIORARI to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny county.
This was an information before an alderman that John W.
Seaman, on December 12th 1880, "being the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, did then and there engage in doing and
performing worldly employment or business, to wit, having open
his place of business on the corner of Station street and the Pennsylvania Railroad, in the city of Pittsburgh, and then and there
engaged in selling, trading and vending tobacco, cigars, candies,
&c., contrary to an Act of Assembly approved April 22d 1794,
and its several supplements in such case made and provided."
The Act of 1794 referred to provides that "If any person shall
do or perform any worldly employment or business whatsoever on
the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday (works of necessity and
charity only excepted) * * * every such person so offending
shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay four dollars." By a
subsequent statute the penalty in Allegheny county was increased
to twenty-five dollars.
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At the hearing the testimony was as follows:
A. C. Fulton: "I "know John W. Seaman, the defendant. I
was in his place of business last Sunday evening. Mr. Seaman
was not there. Mr. Woolslare was tending store. I bought some
cigars there." Cross-examined: "I was there about fifteen
minutes. Don't recollect of others buying there. Jonathan
Woolslare was tending store. I did not see Mr. Seaman there."
John H. Hodel: "I know John Seaman the defendant. I was
in his place of business on Sunday last. The store was open.
Seen sales made there on Sunday last. At one time on Sunday I
saw Mr. Seaman there. Saw others in the store. Mr. Fulton
and Mr. Woolslare were there."
Upon this testimony the alderman found that defendant was
guilty of doing and performing worldly employment or business
on- Sunday, and imposed the fine prescribed by the statute.
Defendant removed the case by certiorarito the Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the judgment, WHIT, J., who delivered
the opinion, saying, inter alia: "In this case the evidence was that
he (defendant) was present in the store on this Sabbath. It is
incredible that the clerk was selling on this day without his
knowledge and authority; he was there present when the store
was open to the public, thus carrying on his worldly business.
* * * It is very clear he was there carrying on his- business,
knowing he was violating the law. The evidence was amply
sufficient to prove that he was carrying on a worldly business,
prohibited by the law."
Defendant removed the case by certiorari to the Supreme
Court.
I. P. Hays (J. S. Strickler with him), for plaintiff in error.
Carpenter, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, C. J.-The offence is sufficiently charged in the
information. The finding of facts by the alderman is clear, full
and specific, and brings the case within the statute. The evidence
showed the place of' business was kept open on Sunday and an
employee was selling cigars. The plaintiff was present a part of
the day, and the conclusion is fully justified that the business was
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carried on with his knowledge and by his authority. The principal as well as the clerk was liable under the statute.
Judgment aflirmed.
The liability of a principal for the
acts of his agent is a question governed
by very different principles and considerations according as the liability,
with which it is sought to affect the principal, is of a civil or a criminal nature.
Civilly, of course, the law is well settled,
that the principal is liable for all the
acts of his agent, done in the course and
within the line of his employment, and
while acting as the servant of the principal. As to third persons the servant
stands as the master ; the latter has held
him out as his authorize . representative,
and must bear the consequences resulting from the relationship which he has
himself established, evefi if the particular
act of the agent for which it is sought
to hold the principal responsible, he one
which, if he had been present, he would
not have apprdved.
But when criminal liability is considered, the consequences of which affect
not merely the pocket, but the reputation
and liberty of the accused, we must have
regard to something more than a mere
delegation of authority. Into crime a
moral element enters ; there must be, in
general, an evil intent, to constitute a
man a criminal, and it would be carrying the principle of representation by an
agent too far, to hold that the servant
represents the moral nature, the moral
action of his master, and that an illegal
act of his, which might very properly
subject the master to a civil action for
damages, sh6uld at the same time render
the master accountable and liable to
punishment for a. crime with which he
was in no way connected except by sustaining the relation of master to the
criminal.
Of course the above' considerations do not imply that a man
cannot be guilty of a crime through his
servant and be punishable therefor.

Quifacitperaliurn,facitpet se will apply
in criminal cases, and indeed, there
may be eases wherein the entire guilt
rests upon the master who commands
the commission of the crime, and not
upon the servant by whose hand" it is
ignorantly committed. A good illustration is found in Regina v. Bleasdale, 2
C. & K. 764 (1848), where the defendant being lessee of a mine, mined .-uil.terrancously into other lands, and thus
stole coal to the value of some 10,0001.
The court held Bleasdale accountable
and not the ignorant miners; the law
being stated thus: "If a man does, by
an innocent agent, a felony, the employer
and not the agent is accountable criminally."
The general rule may be thus formulated: A principal is not criminally liable for the acts of his agent, unless the
act be done by his command or with
his assent, express or implied.
What evidence will authorize a finding of assent or command is a matter of
some interest, and,different views as to
the amount of proof necessary have been
taken.
In the case of the State v. McGrath, 73 Mo. 181, defendant was indicted for illegal sales of liquor made
by his clerk. It seems to have been
admitted that the sale by a recognised
business agent was priinafacieproof of
direction to make such sale by the
master, and the contention turned solely
on the refusal of the court below to
allow the presumption to be rebutted by
evidence of what the master's instructions really were. The Supreme Court
held that such evidence was admissible,
and reversed the judgment. That a
sale by the servant is prinaafade evidence of direction by the master seems
to be established law in Missouri, for
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although SmEwooD, C. J., in Siate v.
Baker, 71 A-do.475 (1880), says, " The
maxim quifacit per alium, fhcit per se,
cited on behalf of the state is only applicable where the instructiois are obeyed,
not where they are, as the evidence
offered tended to show, palpably violated ;'' still, in that case, tile prosecution offered no evidence of direction by
the defbndant, whose wife and brother
had made the illegal sale for which the
defendant stood indicted, and the reversal went upon the ground of the exclusion
of the defendant's evidence.
This view of tihe law seems to be supported by the case of the Coynimonwealth
v. lGillespie, 7 S. & R. 469 (1822),
although that case may be distinguished
from the foregoing by the frct that there
were certain significant omissions of
presumably
evidence of innocence,
within the control of the defendant,
which omissions were considered 's
strengthening the case of the prosecution. Gillespie, who did not live in
-Philadelphia, had opened in that city a
lottery office, and had kept it for several
years. He occasionally visited the city
and his office, leaving it in the interim
in charge of a lad. The. boy, in his
employer's absence, sold ai^ illegal lottery ticket endorsed in tLe name of
Gillespie. An indictment for conspiracy
to'sell illegal lottery tickets was found
against the boy and Gillespie. After a
conviction there were motions for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment. The
Supreme Court sustained the conviction,
did not
DuNcA,, J., saying: "I
instruct the jury that Gillespie was
criminally answerable for the act of his
agent or servant, but I left them to
decide whether, from the whole body of
the evidence, Gillespie was concerned in
the sale of this ticket. The house his ;
the boy conducting business for him as
a lottery broker under his sign, selling
this very ticket as his agent and in his
name. These were circumstances from
which the jury might infer his partici-

pation in the sale of the ticket; more
especially as, if the boy Leid been employed as his agent to sell tickets anthorized by the laws of the state and not
tickets prohibited, a production of his
bo(.ks would establish his innocence.
That criminality, even in acts of the
blackest die, might be made out by circumstantial evidence, I put to the jury
as examples, libels, sold by a child in
the shop of a printer ; tippling-houses,
liquor sold by a boy ; bawdy-houses,
where the keeper kept out of view her
self, though she was the owner of the
house ; and I did put it to the jury as a
case in which tile evidentit rei, the res
ipsa loquitur, might afford satisfactory
evidence of the participation of GilSee also, (Uotaaoawealth v.
lespie."
Nichols, 10 Met. 259.
But authority may also be found
requiring further evidence than that
implied from the mere relation of master
and servant to make even a primaficie
case of gnilt of the former, even in cases
of the same class as the foregoing.
Thus, in People v. Utter, 44 1Barb. 170
(1864), an indictment was found against
a tavern keeper for selling liquor on
Sunday, in contravention of a statute.
The evidence showed that liquor had
been illegally sold in the defendant's
house by his bartender. The defence
requested the court to charge that, to
justify a ,onviction it was not sufficient
to prove that liquor had been sold in the
defendant's house on Sunday, but that
it must be hown that the defendant did
the act personally, or that it was done
by his direction or with his assent.
The court refused so to charge, but
instructed the jury that if they believed
that the bartender had sold liquor in the
defendant's tavern on Sunday, they
might convict, although the defendant
was not present at the sale, and was not
shown to have authorized it : but that if
the defendant had forbidden the sale and
t was made in disobedience of his
or.'e:., he should be acquitted. It was

SEAMAN v. COMMONWEALTH.
bered that a man testifying under a
charge, appears to the jury under a great
disadvantage, and his manifest interest
in his own testimony would naturally
go far to discredit him. On the whole,
it would seem that the safest rule, and
one most in accordance with the spirit
of our laws is to hold the prosecution to
give some testimony either direct or
circuinstantial,*connecting the defendant
with a crime, other than is to be found
in the fact that the defendant's servant
committed an offence in which his master
might possibly have an interest.
To the general rule of liability above
stated, we have found two exceptions.
The first and best known is tlint in the
he was not indictable. HosMER, C. J.,
saying: "In the law of. contracts a case of corporations, which may be inposterior recognition in many cases is dicted for acts of their agents. As a
equivalent to a preceding command;
corporation is a body without a soul,
but it is not so in respect of crimes. and is not possessed of moral attributes,
The defendant is responsible for his own itwas for a long time thought and itis
acts and for those of others done by his frequently stated in old books, that a
express or implied command, but to corporation could not be made criminally
crimes, the maxim onnis ratihabitio answerable.
This idea, however, has
retro raitur, et ,andato equiparatur, is now been abandoned. The only auinapplicable."
thority or thing resembling authority for
In the conflict of authority, it may be it to be found in the early books is coma little difficult to say what should be prised in the declaration in Sutton's Hosthe rule of evidence. On the one hand, pital, 10 Coke 32, that a corporation
it may be said, with great force, that cannot commit treason, and the anonythere are some crimes to which the prin- mous case in 12 Mod. 559, where Lord
cipal may be a party, though the pgent HoLT is reported as saying that "A
only appears therein, of a character such corporation is not indictable, but the parthat it would be almost impossible to con- ticular members of it are." Upon this
very slender basis was built up the edivict the guilty principal if the act of
his known agent were to be excluded fice now overthrown.
As a corporation can act only through
from the considcration of the jury, as
making a primafacie case; and that as its agents, it follows tlt, if it is indictthe laws of criminal evidence have now able, it is then criminally liable for the
generally made the prisoner a witness on acts of its servants. At the present
his own behalf, no injustice is done or day, there is no doubt of the indictability
hardship inflicted by calling on him, of a corporation other than a municipal
after showing the illegal act of his agent one: Queen v. Birminghan,& Gloucester
apparently for the profit of the employer, Railway Co., 2 G. & D. 236 (1842) ;
to clear himself by showing what were Regina v. Great North qf England Railthe instructions given to his agent, and way Co., 9 A. & E. (N.S.) 315 (1846);
that the defendant himself did not know 'State v. Jforis 4 Essex Railroad Co., 3
of or assent to the acts violating the law. Zab. 360 (1852): Comonwealth v.
On the other hand, it is to be remem- Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2
.- 32
VOL. X

held that the court erred in not affirming
the defendant's point.
In the principal case, the Supreme
Court, in affirming the conviction, relied
on the presence of the defendant as evidence of his knowledge of and assent to
the violation of the law. In Morse v.
State, 6 Conn. 9 (1825), it was held
that a ratification of an illegal act of an
agent would not render the employer
criminally liable therefor. The defendant's barkeeper had given credit to a
student of Yale College, contrary to
statute, and the defendant subsequently
ratified the credit. He was indicted and
tried, but the Supreme Court held that
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not for the other ? * * * It is as easy
to charge one person or a body corporate
with erecting a bar across a public road,
as with the non-repair of it, and they
may as well be compelled to pay a fine
for the act as for the omission. * * *
We are told that thisremedy is not
required because the individuals who
concur in voting the orders or in executing the work, may be made answerable for it by criminal proceedings ; of
this there is no doubt. But the public
knows nothing of the former; and the
latter, if they are identified, are commonly persons of the lowest rank, wholly
incompetent to make any reparation for
the injury. There can be no effectual
means for deterring from an oppressive exercise of power for the purpose
of gain, except the remedy be indictment
against those who truly commit it, that
is, the corporation acting by its majority ;
and there is no principle which places
them beyond the reach of such proceedings." The court held the company
indictable.
The question again arose in this
country in 1852, this time before the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in The
State v. The Morris 4- Essex Railroad
Co., 3 Zab. 360, and both the foregoing
authorities were cited to the court, which
North of England Railway Co., supra, determined to follow the English rather
and was fully considered. The company
than the American precedent. GnExx-,
was indicted for cutting through and obC. J., delivered a very learned and
structing a highway by wcrks performed
able opinion, admitting that air ifdictin a course not conformable to the powers meat would not lie against a corporation
conferred by Act of Parliament upon the
for an offence of which a corrupt intent
company. Lord DIhaAx, in the course
or males animus is an essential ingreof his opinion, said : "The argument is,
dient, but showing conclusively that the
that for a wrongful act, a corporation is
position taken by the Queen's Bench as
not amenable to an indictment, though
to misfeasance of the class of which the
for a wrongful omission, it undoubtedly
erection of a nuisance is an example,
is, assuming in the first place that there
was sound and correct. This doctrine
is a plain and obvious distinction bewas cited and followed in Commonwealth
tween the
etwo
species of offence. No v. The Proprietors of Nheu Bedford"
assumption can be more unfounded.
Bridge, 2 Gray 339 (1854), in which
* * * But if the distinction were easily
case the court adverted to the impossibility of preventing a public nuisance
discoverable, why should a corporation
be liable for one species of offence and
otherwise than by indictment. The low

Gray 339 (1854); Deloware Division
Canal Co. v. Commonwealth, 10 P. F.
Smith 367 (1869); and this liability to
indictment has been extended even to
municipal corporations: People v. Corporation of Albany, I I Wend. 539.
A distinction has been taken between
an indictment of a corporation for nonfeasance and one for misfeasance, and
while the former has been almost universally admitted as proper, it has been denied that the latter can -be sustained.
The question of the ind ctability of a
corporation for misfeasance arose in this
country iii The State v. Great Works
Milling and 3Afanifacturing Co., 20 ie.
41 (1841), in which the defendant corporation was indicted for illegally erecting a dam. The court held that the indictment would not lie, taking the broad
ground that it was impossible for a corporation to commit a crime, even by
direct instructions under seal to an
agent, for such direction would be ultra
vires, and that, therefore, however an
indictment might be used to complete the
doing of an act which a corporation was
bound to do and had neglected, an indictment for misfeasance could not be
sustained.
The question came before the Queen's
Bench in 1846, in Regina v. Great
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may now be regarded as settled, that a
corporation may be indicted for misfeasance, subject to the limitation expressed in the State v. The Mo~ris 6
Essex Railroad Co. See, in addition to
the above, State v. Vermont RailroadCo.,
30 Vt. 108 :Louisville 4 Nashville Railroad Co. v. State, 3 Head 523 (1858).
Opposed, however, to the general current stand the Maine case above cited,
and The State v. Ohio 4- Miss. Railroad Co., 23 Ind. 362 (1864), in which
the Supreme Court of Indiana cited and
followed the State v. Great Works Milling and MTanufacturing Co., supra.
The second exception is not so well
established as the first, but it has been
recognised in England,by high authority,
and may be stated as follows, that where
the principal carries on a business with
his own capital for his own profit, and
employs servants who so conduct the
business as to make it a public nuisance,
and the proceedings to remedy the same
are criminal in form only, the principal
will be held liable to an indictment without proof of any participation in or
knowledge of the illegal acts on his part.
.The case in which the exception was
announced is the The Queen v. Stephens,
The deL. R., I Q. B. 702 (1866).
fendant was the owner of a quarry, and
was indicted for throwing rubbish therefrom into a river. Evidence was offered
to show that the defendant was an old
man; who did not personally superintend
his quarry, and had prohibited his workmen from throwing the rubbish into the
river. BaAcKscnus,
J., held the evidence immaterial, and the jury gave a
verdict of guilty. On the case coming
before the court in bane, MELLOn, J.,
said: "It is quite tiue that this, in
point of form, is a proceeding of a
criminal nature, but in substance, I
think it is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and I can see no reason why a
different rule should prevail with regard
to such an act as is charged in the indictment, between proceedings which are

civil and proceedings which are criminal,
I think there may be nuisances of such
a character that the rule I am applying
here would not be applicable to them,
bat here it is perfectly clear that the only
reason for proceeding criminally is that
the nuisance instead of being merely a
nuisance affecting an individual, or one
or two individuals, affects the public at
large, and no private individual, without
receiving some special injury, could nave
maintained an action. Then if the contention of those who say the direction is
wrong is to prevail, the public would
have great difficulty in getting redress.
The object of this indictment is to prevent the recurrence of this nuisance.
The prosecutor cannot proceed by action,
but must proceed by indictment, and if
this were a strictly criminal proceeding,
the prosecution would be met with the
objection that there was no mens rea ;
that the indictment charged the defendant
with a criminal offence, when in reality
there was no proof that the defendant
knew of the act or that lie himself gave
orders to his servants to do the particular
act he is charged with ; still, at the same
time, it is perfectly clear that the defendant finds the capital and carries on the
business which causes the nuisance, and
it is carried on for his benefit ; although
as from age or infirmity the defendant
is unable to go upon the premises, the
business is carried on for him by his
sons, or at all events by his agents.
Under these circumstances the defendant
must necessarily give to his servants or
agents all the authority which is incident
to the carrying on of the business. It
is not because he had, at some time or
other, given directions that it should be
carried on so as not to allow the refuse
from the works to fall into the river, and
desired his servant to provide some other
place for depositing it, that when it has
fallen into the river and has become prejudicial to the public, he can say he is
not liable on an indictment for a nuisance caused by the acts of his servants.
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** * Inasmuch as the object of this
indictment is not to punish the defendant, but really to prevent the nuisance
from being continued, I think that the
evidence which would support a civil
action, would be sufficient to support an
indictment."
SmEA, J., concurred with
2ix ,ton, J.
E AOKBURn , J., said: "I only wish
to guard myself against it being supposed that, either at the trial or now,
'the general rule that a principal is not
criminally answerable for the act of his
agent is infringed. All that it is necessary to say is that when a person maintains works by his capital and employs
servants, and so carries or the works, as
in fact to cause a nuisance to a private
right for which an action would lie, if
the same nuisance inflicts an injury upon
a public right, the remedy for which
would be by indictment-the evidence
which would maintain the action would
also support the indictment ; that is all
that it was necessary to decide, and all
that is decided."
There is also xthat, at first blush,

seems another exception to the rule of
criminal liability of the employer for the
act of his servant, and that is the cast
of the publisher of a newspaper, who is
held criminally accountable for a libel
appearing in his paper, without proof
of any knowledge on his part of the insertion or the contents of the libellous
article.
This liability, however; we
think, does not constitute such an exception, but rests on a different basis, the
ignorant publisher being held responsible for criminal negligence in allowing
the libellous matter to be inserted, through
not taking sufficient and proper means
to prevent his columns being used for
wrongful purposes.
That this is the
true ground of the publisher's liability
in such case, appears from the fact that
he may shield himself by establishing the
fact that he has exercised due care in directing his paper, and that the libel was
published notwith'standing such care: 2
Whart. Crim. Law, sect. 2583; Commoneaelth v. .agan, 107 Mass. 199.
HENY BnD.
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An individual stockholder of a corporation cannot maintain against the corporation
and a third party with whom it is dealing, a suit in equity to protect the interests
of the corporation or to enforce its rights against such third party, unless there exists:
Some action or threaten2d action of the managing board of directors or trustees of the corporation, which is beyond the authority conferred by their charter or
other source of organization ; or,
- Such a fraudulent transaction, completed or threatened, by the acting managers,
in connection with some other party or among themselves, or with the other shareholders, as will result in serious injury to the corporation or to the interests of the
other shareholders; or,
Where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own
interests, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the
other shareholders ; or,
Where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally
pursuing a course in the name of the corporationi which is in violation of the rights
of the other shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of

equity.
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It must also be alleged in the bill, which should be verified by affidavit, that
plaintiff has made an carnest effort to obtain redress at the hands of the dirdctors
and shareholders of the corporation ; that he was the owner of the stock on which
he claims tile
right to sue, at the time of the transactions of which he complains, or
that it has since devolved on him by operation of law ; and, that the suit is not a
collusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction in a case of
which it would otherwise have no cognizance.

from a decree in chancery of the Circuit Court for the
District of California dismissing the appellant's bill.
The plaintiff, who is a citizen of New York, alleges himself to
be a stockholder in the Contra Costa Waterworks Company, a
California corporation, and filed his bill on behalf of himself and
all other stockholders who may choose to come in and contribute
to the costs and expenses of the action.
The defendants were the city of Oakland, the Contra Costa
Waterworks Company and Anthony Chabot, Henry Pierce,
Andrew J. Pope, Charles Holbrook and John W. Coleman, trustees and directors of said company.
The foundation. of the complaint was that the city of Oakland
claimed at the hands of the waterworks company water, without
compensation, for all municipal purposes whatever, including
watering the streets, public squares and parks, flushing sewers and
the like, whereas it was only entitled to receive water free of
charge in cases of fire or other great necessity ; that the waterworks company complied with this demand to the great loss and
injury of the company, and to the diminution of the dividends
which should come to himself and other stockholders, and the
decreased value of their stock. The allegation of plaintiff's attempt
to get the directors of the company to correct this evil was as
follows:
" On the 10th day of July 1878, he applied to the president
and board of directors or trustees of said water company, and
requested them to desist from their illegal and improper practices
aforesaid, and to limit the supply of water free of charge to said
city, to cases of fire or other great necessity, and that said board
should take immediate proceedings to prevent said city from taking
water from the works of said company for any other purpose without compensation ; but said board of directors and trustees have
wholly declined to take any proceedings whatever in the premises,
and threaten to go on and furnish water to the extent of said company's means to said city of Oakland free of charge, for all muniAPPEAL
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cipal purposes, as has heretofore been done, and in oases other
than cases of fire or other great necessity, except as for family
uses hereinbefore referred to ; and your orator avers that by
reason of the premises, said water company and your orator and
the other stockholders thereof have suffered, and will, by a continuance of said acts, hereafter suffer great loss and damage."
To this bill the waterworks company and the directors failed to
make answer, and the city of Oakland filed a demurrer, which was
sustained by the court and the bill dismissed. Complainants then
took this appeal.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-Two grounds of demurrer were set out and relied on
in the court below, and are urged upon us on this appeal. They are:
1. That appellant has shown no capacity in himself to maintain
this suit, the injury, if any exists, being to the interests of the
corporation, and the right to sue belonging solely to that body.
2. That the city of Oakland is entitled to rec.eive, free of compensation, all the water which it is charged to be so using in this
bill, by a sound construction of the law under which the company
is organized.
The first of these causes of demurrer presents a matter of very
great interest, and of growing importance in the courts of the
United States.
Since the decision of this court in the case of -Dodgev. Woolsey,
18 Howard 331, the pirinciples of which have received more than
once the approval of this court, the frequency with which the
most ordinary and usual chancery remedies are sought in the
federal courts by a single stockholder of a corporation who possesses the requisite citizenship, in cases where the corporations
whose rights are to be enforced have no right to sue in those
courts, seems to justify a consideration of the grounds on which
that case was decided, and of the just limitations of the exercise of
those principles.
This practice has grown until the corporations created by the
laws of the states bring a large part of their controversies with
their neighbors and fellow-citizens into the courts of the United
States for adjudication, instead of the state courts, which are their
natural, their lawful and their appropriate forum. Itis not difficult to see how this has come to pass. A corporation having
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such a controversy, which it is foreseen must end in litigation, and
preferring for any reason whatever that this litigation shall take
place in a federal court, in which it can neither sue its real antagonist nor be sued by it, has recourse to a holder of one of its shares,
who is a citizen of another state. This stockholder is called into
consultation, and is fold that his corporation has rights which the
directors refuse to enforce or to protect. He instantly demands of
them to do their duty in this regard, which of course they fail or
refuse to do, and thereupon he discovers that he has two causes of
action entitling him to equitable relief in a court of chancery,
namely: one against his own company, of which he is a corporator,
for refusing to do what he has requested them to do; and the other
against the party which contests the matter in controversy with
that corporation. These two causes of action he combines in an
equity suit in the circuit court of the United States, because he is
a citizen of a different state, though the ieal partieg to the controversy could have no standing in that court. If no non-resident
stockholder exists, a transfer of a few shares is made to some
citizen of another state, who then brings the suit. The real
defendant in this action may be quite as willing to have the case
tried in the federal court as the corporation and its stockholder.
If so, he makes no objection, and the case proceeds to a hearing.
Or he may file his answer denying the special grounds set up in
the bill as a reason for the stockholder's interference, at the same
time that he answers to the merits. In either event the whole
case is prepared for hearing on the merits, the right of the stockholder to a standing in equity receives but little attention, and the
overburdened courts of the United States have this additional
important litigation imposed upon them. by a simulated and conventional arrangement, unauthorized by the facts of the case or by
the sound principles of equity jurisdiction.
That the vast and increasing proportion of the active business
of modern life which is done by corporations should call into
exercise the beneficent powers and flexible methods of courts of
equity, is neither to be wondered at nor regretted, and this is
especially true of controversies growing out of the relations
between the stockholder and the corporation of which he is a
member. The exercise of this power in protecting the stockholder against the frauds of the governing body of directors or
trustees, and in preventing their exercise, in the name of the cor-
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poration, of powers which are outside of their charters or articles
of association, has been frequent, and is most beneficial, and is
undisputed. These are real contests, however, between the stockholder and the corporation of which he is a member.
The case before us goes beyond this.
This corporation, like others, is created a body politic and corporate that it may in its corporate name transact all the business
which its charter or other organic act authorizes it to do.
Such corporations may be common carriers, bankers, insurers,
merchants, and may make contracts, commit torts and incur
liabilities, and may sue or be sued in their corporate name in
regard to all of these transactions. The parties who deal with
them understand this, and that they are dealing with a body
which has these rights and is subject to these obligations, and
they do not deal with or count upon any liability to the stockholder whom they do hot know and with whom they have no
privity of contract or other relation.
The principle involved in the case of Dodge v. TFoolsey permits
the stockholder in one of these corporations to step in between that
corporation and the party with whom it has been dealing and
institute and control a suit in which the rights involved are the
rights of the corporation, and the controversy one really between
that corporation, entirely capable of asserting its own rights, and
the other party, who is equally so.
This is a very different affair from a controversy between the
shareholder of a corporation and that corporation itself, or its
managing directors or trustees, or the other shareholders, who
may be violating his rights or destroying the property in which
he has an interest. Into such a contest the outsider, dealing with
the corporation through its managing agents in a matter within
their authority, cannot be dragged, except where it is necessary to
prevent an absolute failure of justice in cases which have been
recognised as exceptional in their character and calling for the
extraordinary powers of a court of equity. It is, therefore,
always a question of equitable jurisprudence, and as such has
within the last forty years, received the repeated consideration of
the highest courts of England and of this country.
The earliest English case in which this subject received any
very careful consideration is that of Boss v. ffarbottle, before
Vice-Chancellor WIGRtAM, whose very full and able opinion is
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reported in 2 Hare's Oh. R. 488. The case was decided in 1843
on a demurrer to the bill, which was brought by Foss and Turton,
two shareholders in an incorporation called the Victoria Park
Oompany, on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders,
except those who were made defendants, against the directors and
one shareholder not a director, and against the solicitor and architect of the company. The bill charged the defendants with concerting and effecting various fraudulent and illegal transactions,
whereby the property of the company was misapplied, aliened and
wasted. It alleged that there had ceased to be a sufficient number
of qualified directors to constitute a board; that the company had
no clerk or office; and it prayed for the appointment of a receiver
and a decree against the defendants to make good the loss. After
showing that the case was one in which the right of action was
in the company, the vice-chancellor says: "In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are not the
same thing for purposes like this, and the only question can be,
whether the facts alleged in this case justify a departure fitom the
rule which primafacie would require that the corporation should
sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the name
of some one whom the law has appointed to be its representative."
Again, after pointing out that cases may arise where the claims
of justice would be found superior to the technical rules respecting
the mode in which corporations are required to sue, he adds:
"But, on the other hand, it must not be without reasons of a
very urgent character that the established rules of law and practice
are to be departed from, rules which, though in a sense technical,
are founded on the general principles of justice and convenience;
and the question is whether a case is stated in this bill entitling
plaintiffs to sue in their private character." IHe then in an
elaborate argument holds that the bill is fatally defective because
it does not aver that there is no acting or de facto board of directors who might have ordered the bringing of this suit; and,
secondly, that it was the duty of the plaintiffs-the two shareholders who complain of what had been done-to have called a
meeting of the shareholders or attended at some regular annual
meeting and obtained the action of a majority on the matters in
issue. The majority, he says, may have been content with what
was done and may have ratified the action of the board, in which
case the whole body would have been bound by it.
VOL. XXX.-33
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The demurrer was sustained and the bill dismissed.
In the subsequent case of Mlozley v. Alston, 1 Phillips's Ch.
R. 790, decided in 1847, Lord Chancellor LYNDHURST says that
"the observations of the vice-chancellor in Toss v. Harbottle correctly represent what is the principle and practice of the court in
reference to suits of this description."
These cases have been referred to again and again in the English courts as leading cases on the subject to which they relate and
always with approval.
In the case of Gray v. Lewis, decided in the Chancery Appeals,
in 1873, Sir W. L. JAMZES, L. J., said: "I am of opinion that the
only person, if you may call it a person, having a right to complain was the incorporated society called Charles Lafitte & Co.
In its corporate character it was liable to be sued and was entitled
to sue, and if the company sued in its corporate character, the
defendant might allege a release or compromise by the company in
its corporate character-a defence which would not be open in a
suit whel'e a plaintiff is suing on behalf of himself and other shareholders. I think it is of the utmost importance to maintain the
rule laid down in iirozley v. Alston and Toss v. .Harbottle, to
which, as I understand, the only exception is, where the corporate
body has got into the hands of directors, and of the majority,
which directors and majority are using their power for the purpose
of doing something fraudulent against the minority, who are overpowered by them, as in Atwood v. f21ferrywether, where ViceChancellor WooD sustained a bill by a shareholder on behalf of
himself and others, and there it was after an attempt had been
made to obtain proper authority from the corporate body itself in
a public meeting assembled:" Law Rep., 8 Ch. 1035.
But perhaps the best assertion of the rule and of the exceptions
to it are found in the opinion of the court by the same learned
justice in the case of MeDougall v. Gardiner,in 1875, Law Rep.,
1 Chan. Div. 21: "I am of opinion," he says, "that this demurrer ought to be allowed. I think it is of the utmost importance
in all these controversies that the rule which is well known in this
court as the rule in M1ozley v. Alston, and Lord v. Copper Mining Co., and Toss v. JZarbottle, should always be adhered to; that
is to say, that nothing connected with internal disputes between
shareholders is to be made the subject of a bill by some one shareholder on behalf of himself and others, unless there be something

HAWES v. CONTRA COSTA WATER COMPANY.

illegal, oppressive or fraudulent-unless there is something ultra
vires on the part of the company qua company, or on the part of
the majority of the company, so that they are not fit persons to
determine it, but that every litigation must be in the name of the
company if the company really desire it. Because there may be a
great many wrongs committed in a company, there may be claims
against directors, there may be claims against officers, there may
be claims against debtors, there may be a variety of things of
which a company may well be entitled to complain but which, as a
matter of good sense. they do not think it right to make the subject of litigation, and it is the company as a company which has
to determine whether it will make anything that is a wrong to the
company a subject-matter of litigation or whether it will take steps
to prevent the wrong from being done."
The cases in the English courts are numerous, but the foregoing
citations give the spirit of them correctly.
In this country the cases outside of the federal courts are not
numerous, and while they admit the right of a stockholder to sue
in cases where the corporation is the proper party to bring the
suit, they limit this right to cases where the directors are guilty of
a fraud, or a breach of trust, or are proceeding ultra vires. See
Mfarch v. Bastern Railroad Co., 40 N. H. 549; Peabody v.
Flint, 6 Allen (Mass.) 52 ; Brown v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass.
378, where the general doctrine and its limitations are very well
stated. See also -Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Me. 9, and Samuel v.
Holladay, 1 Woolworth 400.
The case of Dodge v. Woolsey, decided in this court in 1855, is,
however, the leading case on the subject in this country.
And we do not believe, notwithstanding some expressions in the
opinion, that it is justly chargeable with the abuses we have mentioned. It was manifestly well considered, and the opinion is
unusually long, discussing the point now under consideration with
a full reference to the decisions then made in the courts of England
The suit-a bill in chancery-was brought in the Circuit Court
for the District of Ohio by Woolsey, a stockholder of the Commercial Bank of Cleveland, and a citizen of Connecticut, against
that bank, its managing directors, and Dodge, tax-collector of
the county in which the bank was situated, citizens of Ohio.
The bill alleged that Dodge had levied upon property of the bank
to make collection of a tax, which by the Constitution of the state
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of Ohio, the bank was bound to pay; that in that respect the Constitution, then recently adopted, impaired the obligation of the
contract of the state with the bank, contained in its charter. It appeared in the case that Woolsey had, by letter directed to the board
of directors, requested them to institute proceedings to prevent the
collection of this tax, but the board, by a resolution, declined to
take any such action, while expressing their opinion that the tax
was illegal. In the opinion of the court, reciting the circumstances which justified its interposition at the suit of the stockholder, the allegation of the bill is adverted to, that if the taxes
are enforced it will annul the contract with the state concerning
taxation, and that the tax is so onerous upon the bank that it will
compel a suspension and final cessation of its business. The
following extract from Angell & Ames on Corporations is cited
with approval: "Though the result of the authorities clearly is
that in a corporation, when acting within the scope of, and in obedience to, the provisions of its constitution, the will of the majority,
clearly expressed, must govern, yet beyond the limits of the act
of incorporation the will of the majority cannot make the act valid,
and the po'er of a court of equity may be put in motion at the
instance of a single shareholder, if he can show that the corporation are employing their statutory powers for the accomplishment
of purposes not within the scope of their institution. Yet it is to
be observed that there is an important distinction between this
class of cases and those in which there is no breach of trust, but
only error and misapprehension or simple negligence on the part
of the directors." And the court adds: "It is obvious from this
rule that the circumstances of each case must determine the jurisdiction of a court of equity to give the relief sought."
A very large part of the opinion is devoted to the consideration
of the high function of this court in construing the Constitution
of the United States, and it is impossible not to see the influence
on the mind of the writer of that opinion, of the fact that the
only question on the merits of the case was one which peculiarly
belonged to the federal judiciary, and especially to this court to
decide, namely, whether the Constitution of the state of Ohio
violated the obligation of the contract concerning taxation found
in the charter of the bank.
As the law then stood there was no means by which the bank,
being a citizen of the same state with Dodge, the tax-collector,
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could bring into a court of the United States the right which it
asserted under the Constitution, to be relieved of the tax in question, except by writ of error to a state court from the Supreme
Court of the United States.
That difficulty no longer exists, for by the Act of March 3d
1875, all suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States may be brought originally in the Circuit Courts of the
United States without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Under this statute, if it had then existed, the bank in the case of
Dodge v. Woolsey could undoubtedly have brought suit to restrain
the collection of the tax in its own name, without resort to one
of its shareholders for that purpose.
And this same statute, while enlarging the jurisdiction of the
Circu'it Courts in cases fairly within the constitutional grant of
power to the federal judiciary, strikes a blow by its fifth section
at improper and collusive attempts to impose upon those courts
the cognizance of cases not justly belonging to them. It declares
if at any time in the progress of a case, either originally commenced in a Circuit Court, or removed there from a state court, it
shall appear to said court "that such suit does not really involve a
dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said
court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the
purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act,
the said Circuit Court shall proceed no further, but shall dismiss
the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed."
It is believed that a rigid enforcement of this statute by the circuit courts would relieve them of many cases which have no proper
place on their dockets.
This examination of the case of Dodge v. Woolsey satisfies us
that it does not establish, nor was it intended to establish, a doctrine
on this subject different in any material respect from that found
in the cases in the English and in other American courts, and that
the recent legislation of Congress referred to, leaves no reason for
any expansion of the rule in that case beyond its fair interpretation.
We understand that doctrine to be that to enable a stockholder
in a corporation to sustain in a court of equity in his own name, a
suit founded on a right of action existing in the corporation itself,
and in which the corporation itself is the appropriate plaintiff,
there must exist as the foundation of the suit-7-
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Some action or threatened action of the managing board of
directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the
authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of
organization;
Or such a fraudulert transaction completed or contemplated by
the acting managers, in connection with some other party, or
among themselves, or with other shareholders as will result in
serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other
shareholders;
Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders;
Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corporation, which is in violation of the rights of the other shareholders,
and which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity.
Possibly other cases may arise in which, to prevent irremediable
injury, or a total failure of justice, the court would be justified in
exercising its powers, but the foregoing may be regarded as- an
outline of the principles which govern this class of cases.
But in addition to the existence of grievances which call for
this kind of relief, it is equally important that before the shareholder is permitted in his own name to institute and conduct a
litigation which usually belongs to the corporation, he should show
to the satisfaction of the court that he has exhausted all the means
within his reach to obtain, within the corporation itself; the redress of his grievances, of action in conformity to his wishes. I-To
must make an earnest, not a simulated effort, With the managing
body of the corporation, to induce remedial action on their part,
and this must be made apparent to the court. If time permits or
has permitted, he must show, if he fails with the directors, that he
has made an honest effort to obtain action by the stockholders as
a body, in the matter of which he complains. And he must show
a case, if this .is not done, where it could not be done, or it was
not reasonable to require it.
The efforts to induce such action as complainant desires on the
part of the directors, and of the shareholders when that is necessary, and the cause of failure in these efforts, should be stated
with particularity, and an allegation that complainant was a shareholder at the time of the transactions of which he complains, or
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that his shares has devolved on him since by operation of law, and
that the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the
United States jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise
have no cognisance, should be in the bill, which should be verified
by affidavit.
It is needless to say that appellant's bill presents no such case as
we have here supposed to be necessary to the jurisdiction of the court.
He merely avers that he requested the president and directors
to desist from furnishing water free of expense to the city, except
in case of fire or other great necessity, and that they declined to
do as- he requested. No correspondence on the subject is given.
No reason for declining. We have here no allegation of a meeting of the directors, in which the matter was formally laid before
them for action. No attempt to consult the other shareholders to
ascertain their opinions, or obtain their action. But within five
days after his application to the directors this bill is filed. There
is no allegation of fraud or of acts ultra vires, nor of destruction
of property, or of irremediable injury of any kind.
Conceding appellant's construction of the company's charter to
be correct, there is nothing which forbids the corporation from
dealing with the city in the manner it has done. That city conferred on the company valuable rights by special ordinance, namely,
the use of the streets for laying its pipes, and the privilege of furnishing water to the whole population. It may be the exercise of
the highest wisdom to let the city use the water in the manner
complained of. The directors are better able to act understandingly on this subject than a stockholder residing in New York.
The great body of the stockholders residing in Oakland or other
places in California. may take this view of it and be content to
abide by the action of their directors.
If this be so, is a bitter litigation with the city to be conducted
by one stockholder for the corp.oration and all other stockholders,
because the amount of his dividends is diminished ?
This question answers itself, and without considering the other
point raised by the demurrer, we are of opinion that it was properly sustained, and the bill dismissed, because the appellant by
that bill shows no standing in a court of equity-no right in himself to prosecute this suit.
The decree of the Circuit Court is, therefore, affirmed.
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The doctrine of lispendens cannot be extended to support, after a decree in an
equity proceeding involving the title to land, a bill against third parties to recover
the value of wood cut therefrom pending the proceeding.
Pending a bill in equity affecting the title of realty, third persons with the consent
of the respondents cut, carried off and appropriated quantities of wood and brush
from the realty in question. After a decree in his favor the complainant filed
another bill in equity against these third persons to ascertain the amount of stuff cut
and carried off by them, which was charged to be of the value of five hundred
dollars, and to enforce payment from them. This bill charged no conspiracy with
the former respondepts, nor any attempt to commit actual fraud. The respondents
demurred. Held, that the bill was virtually an action of trover and conversion for
wood cut pending the former bill, and could not be maintained.

BILL IN. EQUITY for discovery, to ascertain the amount of timber

cut by the respondents, pending a bill in equity affecting the title
to the realty, and to enforce payment for the timber.
The bill alleged that in November 1875 the complainant, being
the owner of a farm of one hundred and fifty acres in the town
of Gloucester, was fraudulently induced by one Peter Kiernan to
convey the farm to him in exchange for five lots of land in the city
of Providence; that the said Peter, after receiving the deed of the
farm, conveyed it to his six children, named ; that in November
1876, the complainant being satisfied that she had been defrauded,
commenced a suit against said Peter and his children, to procure a
reconveyance of the farm and the improvements thereon; that she
prosecuted the suit diligently to final decree, which was entered
February 21st 1880, directing a reconveyance of the farm and
improvements. The bill also alleged that at the time the farm was
conveyed to Peter Kiernan a considerable portion of it was wooded,
and that during the pendency of her suit against said Peter and his
children, the defendants, one of whom had actual notice of the suit,
entered on the farm. and with the consent of said Peter or his
children cut and carried away a large quantity of the wood and
brush growing thereon, of the estimated value of five hundred
dollars. Complainant prayed for a decree for the value of the wood
and brush so cut and carried away. Defendants demurred.
William JH. Baker, for complainant.
Z. 0. Slocum, for respondents.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
DfRFEE, C. J.-The bill does not allege that the defendants
conspired with Peter Kiernan and his children to defraud the complainant, nor to frustrate her suit to any extent, nor does it charge
them with an intent to commit any actual fraud of any kind upon
her. It is true the bill states that one of the defendants knew of
the former suit, but the defendant having this knowledge does not
appear to have been connected in business with the other defendants, nor to have sustained any relation to them by virtue of which
what he knew could be imputed to them as something that they
knew; and the bill, though it does not seek to charge all the
defendants jointly for the wood, seeks, nevertheless, to charge them
all alike on the same ground. The grdund of relief is simply that
the defendants cut and carried away the wood and brush during the
penden6y of her former suit, and that, the wood and brush having
been involved in that suit as a part of her farm, she is entitled to
recover its value of the defendants by force of the doctrine of lis
pendens.
The doctrine of lis pendens is this, that real property, or, to
some extent, personal property, when it has been put in litigation
by a suit in equity, in which it is specifically described, will, if the
suit is prosecuted with diligence, be bound by the final decree, notwithstanding any intermediate alienation. It will be seen that the
doctrine as stated does not reach the case at bar, for, in the case at
bar, the complainant is seeking to recover, not any property which
is bound by the decree, but the value simply of certain property
which was not bound by the decree, but which, in all probability,
had been burned up before the decree was entered. She cites no
satisfactory precedent for such an extension of the doctrine. The
question is, can it be so extended. We think not. The doctrine
is founded, on the policy that property which is specifically sued for
shall abide the result of the suit, for otherwise, by successive alienations, the litigation might be indefinitely prolonged: Bellan/ v.
Sabine, 1 De G. & J. 566. The doctrine relates only to changes
of ownership, but assumes that the property itself will remain
either identically the same or be at least specifically traceable into
some new form in Which it can be reached. That is not the case
here. The suit here is in the nature of an action of trover and
conversion. It seeks not the thing, but the value of the thing, or
damages for its conversion. It is a mere personal claim. If the
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